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NOTE
THE STARS AND STRIPES IN AL-FARDOS
SQUARE: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE




The hoisting of the stars and stripes onto the statue of Saddam
Hussein in Baghdad's al-Fardos Square on April 9, 2003,1 was both a
signal of the beginning of the end of the military conquest of Iraq and
a sign of things to come. President Bush officially announced the end
of "major combat operations" on May 1,2 and although fighting and
casualties continued thereafter,3 the Anglo-American coalition turned
to administering the territory they had conquered.
To this end, on May 6, 2003, President Bush named Paul Bremer, a
diplomat and former head of the Counter-Terrorism Department at
the United States State Department, as the Administrator of the
Coalition Provisional Authority ("CPA").4 On May 16, Bremer
* J.D. Candidate, 2005, Fordham University School of Law. Many thanks to
Professor Thomas H. Lee for his helpful guidance. I would also like to thank my
parents for their continuing support, and Sarah for putting up with me through this
process. This Note is dedicated to my Grandfather, Benjamin Ottolenghi, and my
Grandmother, Luisa Cassuto.
1. See BBC News, Baghdad Falls to US Forces (April 9, 2003), at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle-east/2933707.stm.
2. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, President Bush Announces Major
Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended (May 1, 2003), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releasesl2003/05/iraq/20030501-15.html; see also
Editorial, A Long Way From Victory, N.Y. Times, May 2, 2003, at A32.
3. See, e.g., Richard A. Oppel Jr., G. Killed and 6 Are Wounded in Stepped-Up
Attacks, N.Y. Times, July 17, 2003, at A10; Patrick E. Tyler, Troops Attacked in
Baghdad in Fresh Signs of Resistance, N.Y. Times, June 2, 2003, at Al.
4. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, President Names Envoy to Iraq:
Remarks by the President in Photo Opportunity After Meeting with the Secretary of
Defense (May 6, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2003/05/iraq/20030506-3.html; see also Ambassador L. Paul Bremer,
Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority, at http://www.cpa-
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promulgated the first CPA regulation, which enumerated the powers
of the CPA, including the temporary exercise of government powers
to "provide for the effective administration of Iraq during the period
of transitional administration."5 The stated goals of the CPA include
restoring security and stability, creating conditions in which the Iraqi
people can freely determine their political future, and facilitating
economic recovery and reconstruction.6  The United States
consequently vested the CPA with exclusive executive, legislative, and
judicial authority over Iraq, and required all CPA regulations or
orders to be approved by the Administrator.7 United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1483 of May 22, 2003, recognized this
organizational framework by calling upon "the Authority" to
"promote the welfare of the Iraqi people through the effective
administration of the territory," and for the creation of an "Iraqi
interim administration" to be run by Iraqis.8 On July 13, Bremer
recognized the creation of a Governing Council of Iraqis as "the
principal body of the Iraqi interim administration."9 United Nations
Security Council resolution 1511 of October 16 invited Bremer to
"return governing responsibilities and authorities to the people of
Iraq," and to provide the Security Council with a timetable for doing
so.
10
As these actions illustrate, the U.S.-led coalition has laid out a
framework for the governance of Iraq in the post-war period. Since
major combat operations have officially ended, the international legal
issues raised by the occupation of Iraq by U.S.-led forces have come
to center stage. Those issues involve, at the formal doctrinal level,
debates over the extent to which the governance of post-conflict Iraq
is controlled by a subset of the laws of war pertaining to occupation,
or by a more amorphous body of rules and experiences which this
Note shall call the "United Nations governance" model.
iraq.org/bremerbio.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2003) (providing an official biography of
Ambassador Bremer).
5. Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation Number 1, CPA/REG/16 May
2003/01, available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/REGI.pdf.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. S.C. Res. 1483, U.N. SCOR, 4761st mtg. at 2, 3, U.N. Doc S/Res/1483 (2003).
9. Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation Number 6, CPA/REG/13 July
2003/06, available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/REG6.pdf.
10. S.C. Res. 1511, U.N. SCOR, 4844th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc S/Res/1511 (2003).
11. According to a spokesperson from the Coalition Press Information Center in
Baghdad, as of December 13, 2003, the following countries had contributed troops to
Operation Iraqi Freedom and its aftermath: Albania, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria,
Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador,
Estonia, Georgia, Honduras, Hungary, Italy, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania,
Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Thailand, the Philippines, Romania, Slovakia, South Korea, Spain,
Ukraine, and the United Kingdom. Telephone interview with Spokesperson for the
Coalition Press Information Center in Baghdad, Iraq (Jan. 7, 2004).
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LAW OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION
The law of belligerent occupation 12 was originally codified almost
one hundred years ago, 3 and it is clearly a product of its time in its
assumption that occupation is a temporary situation following a war
between two sovereign states. This assumption has not been
significantly modified since its inception. 14  Although the Fourth
Geneva Convention of 194911 addressed the same issue, the law of
occupation has rarely been invoked in the post Second World War
period. 6 Thus, the dormant nature of the law of occupation leads to
questions about its scope, application, and relevance to a modern
occupation situation. This is true in an abstract sense, but the
practical example of the occupation of Iraq presents new challenges
and raises important questions about this body of law.
Despite its apparent fall from favor since the Second World War,
the law of occupation has made a comeback in Iraq. In a joint letter
to the United Nations Security Council on May 8, 2003, the United
States and United Kingdom affirmed that they would "strictly abide
by their obligations under international law, including those relating
to the essential humanitarian needs of the people of Iraq."' 7 While
this language does not seem by itself to signify an acceptance of the
obligations imposed by the formal law of belligerent occupation, the
joint letter was noted in Security Council Resolution 1483, which
recognized (albeit not in the operative part of the resolution) the
"specific authorities, responsibilities, and obligations under applicable
international law of these states [the U.S. and U.K.] as occupying
powers.' 18 Additionally, in the operative part of the resolution, the
12. There is no accepted definition of the law of belligerent occupation, and no
agreement as to whether the laws of belligerent occupation should be distinguished
from "military occupation," or even simply "occupation," despite the efforts of some
scholars. See generally Raymond Robin, Des Occupations Militaires en Dehors des
Occupations de Guerre (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace trans., 1942)
(1913). One scholar has attempted to create sub-classifications within the law of
"military occupation." Adam Roberts, What is a Military Occupation?, 55 Brit. Y.B.
Int'l L. 249 (1985). For the purposes of this Note, the terms "belligerent occupation"
and "laws of occupation" refer to the codification of the rights and obligations of
occupants as established first in the Hague Regulations and then in the Geneva
Convention. Hague Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277 [hereinafter Hague Regulations]; Geneva
Convention (IV) for the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention].
13. Hague Regulations, supra note 12, 36 Stat. at 2277.
14. See infra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
15. Geneva Convention, supra note 12, 6 U.S.T. at 3516, 75 U.N.T.S at 287.
16. See Eyal Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation 149 (1993).
17. Letter from the Permanent Representatives of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the United Nations
Addressed to the President of the Security Council (May 8, 2003), U.N. Doc.
S/2003/538 [hereinafter Letter to the President of the Security Council].
18. S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 8, at 2. This language seems to be reinforced in the
operative part of Security Council resolution 1511, which "[r]eaffirms... the
temporary nature of the exercise by the Coalition Provisional Authority... of the
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Security Council called upon "all concerned to comply fully with their
obligations under international law including in particular the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 and the Hague Regulations of 1907. " 19
While some commentators have welcomed this development in the
United States' attitude towards international law,2 ° it remains unclear
what implications the law of occupation will have in Iraq. Given the
evolution in the rationales for different occupations since the Hague
Regulations of 1907, is the law of occupation flexible enough to allow
the occupant, for example, to fashion a new constitution and extract
oil from the occupied country? Or is the law of occupation outdated
and unsuited to the needs of both the occupant and the occupied
people? Perhaps an alternative model, and a different body of law,
would better serve the aims of the occupying powers in Iraq, while at
the same time safeguarding the rights of the local population.
Part I.A. of this Note describes the law of occupation as codified in
the Hague Regulations of 19072 and the Geneva Convention of
1949,22 and explores both the assumptions it is based on and the
limitations it imposes on occupants in practice. Part I.B. explores an
alternative model of post-conflict governance that has emerged from
the experiences of the United Nations in Kosovo and East Timor,
"United Nations governance." 23 Part II evaluates the problems that
may arise in applying the law of occupation as it currently stands in
Iraq, stemming from the differences in rationales behind the law of
occupation generally, and the occupation in Iraq specifically.
Additionally, these problems are considered through the alternative
perspective of the United Nations governance model, including what
additional advantages or disadvantages such a model may provide.
Part III argues that the law of occupation as it stands is too vague and
outdated to be applied to Iraq. Instead, the alternative model would
allow more flexibility, as well as provide greater political and
international legitimacy for the transitional regime of the occupied
state.
I. THE LAW OF POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES
Two distinct, albeit overlapping, categories of legal rules govern
different types of post-conflict situations. Under the provisions of the
specific responsibilities, authorities, and obligations under applicable international
law recognized and set forth in resolution 1483 ." S.C. Res. 1511, supra note 10, at 2.
19. S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 8, at 2.
20. See, e.g., Suzanne Nossel, Winning the Postwar, Legal Aff., May/June 2003, at
18.
21. Hague Regulations, supra note 12, 36 Stat. at 2277.
22. Geneva Convention, supra note 12, 6 U.S.T. at 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. at 287.
23. See generally Michael J. Matheson, United Nations Governance of Postconflict
Societies, 95 Am. J. Int'l L. 76 (2001) (outlining the development of U.N. governance
of post-conflict societies).
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Hague Regulations, an occupation exists when, following a war
between states, territory "is actually placed under the authority of the
hostile army., 24 Thus, on a theoretical level, an occupation follows a
military defeat, be it total or partial, and the assumption of control by
a hostile army. The applicable law in such a situation is the
international law of occupation, derived from the famous Lieber Code
of 1863 for the Union Army in the Civil War, which recognized the
necessity of mitigating the severity of war on local populations.25
These concerns, as well as regulations regarding the power and
responsibility of the occupying power were first codified by the
international community in the Hague Regulations.26
In contrast, what may be labeled United Nations governance of
post-conflict societies arises following a finding by the United Nations
Security Council of a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act
of aggression" pursuant to Article 39 of the U.N. Charter, 27 and an
ensuing decision to adopt "measures not involving the use of armed
force" to address such a situation under Article 41.28 This was, for
example, the framework used to establish the United Nations Mission
in Kosovo ("UNMIK") and the United Nations Transitional
Authority in East Timor ("UNTAET").29 The applicable law in such
a situation is "United Nations law derived from the powers of that
organisation," meaning both Security Council Resolutions and
regulations adopted by its representatives in the administered
24. Hague Regulations, supra note 12, art. 42, 36 Stat. at 2306.
25. Adjt Gen.'s Office, War Dept., Instructions for the Government of Armies of
the United States in the Field, General Orders No. 100, Apr. 24, 1863, reprinted in
Richard Shelly Hartigan, Lieber's Code and the Law of War 45 (1983). The Code was
written by Dr. Francis Lieber, a Professor of Modern History, Political Science and
International, Civil and Common Law at Columbia College. Lieber's objective,
under the guidance of the War Department, was to "attempt a revision and
systematization of all the rules that had governed land warfare." Hartigan, supra, at
14-15. As such, the Code is mainly a military manual detailing the legal norms of
warfare, but one of its ten sections covers the treatment of enemy property, and the
Code also refers to civilians, stating that "the unarmed citizen is to be spared in
person, property, and honor as much as the exigencies of war will admit." Adjt Gen.'s
Office, supra, at 49. Although the Lieber Code, strictly speaking, addressed
occupation in a "domestic" civil war, its principles have inspired the laws of war
including those pertaining to occupations in international settings. L.C. Green, The
Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict 256 (2d ed. 2000); see also Burrus M.
Carnahan, Lincoln, Lieber and the Laws of War: The Origins and Limits of the
Principle of Military Necessity, 92 Am. J. Int'l L. 213 (1998).
26. Hague Regulations, supra note 12, 36 Stat. at 2277.
27. U.N. Charter art. 39.
28. Id. art. 41.
29. See S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. SCOR, 4011th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc S/Res/1244 (1999)
(deploying a U.N.-supervised international civil and security force in Kosovo with
responsibilities for "[p]romoting the establishment ... of substantial autonomy and
self-government in Kosovo"); S.C. Res. 1272, U.N. SCOR, 4057th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc




territory,3" which have focused on the reconstruction of the governed
territory.
Such United Nations governance theoretically could follow a war
between states and create an area of overlap with the law of
occupation, because the Security Council could declare a war between
states a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression," 3 1 thus opening the door for United Nations governance.
However, in practice, the use of United Nations governance has been
limited to situations of internal and inter-ethnic conflict within states
and their resulting humanitarian consequences, an area outside the
theoretical scope of the law of occupation.
The assumptions behind these two formal (albeit in the latter case
rather amorphous) bodies of law are completely different, as the law
of occupation presumes a pre-existing fully-functioning sovereign
state has lost a war and that thereafter the status quo must be
restored,32 whereas the United Nations governance model presumes
that a state has failed in some way and that the outcome sought is not
a return to the status quo, but rather the political and economic
reconstruction of the state.33 Consequently, these two bodies of law
impose different obligations and levels of authority on the occupant or
territorial administrator, a fact which may result in important
differences on the ground in the occupied country or U.N.-governed
territory.
A. The Law of Belligerent Occupation
1. Assumptions and Codification
The law of belligerent occupation, as understood today, has two
principal codified sources: the Hague Regulations of 1907"4 and the
Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949,"5 both of which have been ratified
by the United States and the United Kingdom.36 Professor Eyal
Benvenisti argues that the Hague Regulations reflect the attitudes of
30. Matthias Ruffert, The Administration of Kosovo and East-Timor by the
International Community, 50 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 613, 622 (2001).
31. U.N. Charter art. 39.
32. See infra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 165-70, 190-200 and accompanying text.
34. Hague Regulations, supra note 12, 36 Stat. at 2277.
35. Geneva Convention, supra note 12, 6 U.S.T. at 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. at 287.
36. Hague Regulations, supra note 12, 36 Stat. at 2277; Geneva Convention, supra
note 12, 6 U.S.T. at 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. at 287. The Hague Regulations are now clearly
considered binding even on non-signatories, for they have been declared to be
customary international law, whereas the Geneva Conventions, insofar as they build
upon concepts embodied in the Hague Regulations, are also considered to be
customary international law. Benvenisti, supra note 16, at 8, 98; Theodor Meron, The
Geneva Conventions as Customary Law, 81 Am. J. Int'l L. 348, 364 (1987).
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its framers with regard to the laws of conflict and its aftermath. 37
These attitudes were the culmination of a long process of change in
the concept of occupation, which until the eighteenth century
comprised the notion that the occupant "could do what he liked with
[the occupied territory] and its inhabitants."38 This clearly was no
longer the case during the first Hague Peace Conference of 1899 and
its 1907 successor.39 Indeed, with regard to occupation, the Hague
Conferences emphasized restricting the power of the occupying power
in a number of areas, from the use of natural resources to the
treatment of the occupied population.4 ° In sum, the occupying power
now faced specific post-conflict rights and responsibilities.
The prevailing European attitude toward war at the time of the
Hague Conferences included two core beliefs. First, as expressed in
the Rousseau-Portales Doctrine,41 war was considered a contest
between sovereign governments and their military forces, not an affair
of civilians.42 Second, because war was understood as essentially a
struggle between sovereigns, an ensuing occupation of territory by the
victorious power was perceived as temporary, with no permanent
transfer of sovereignty to the occupying power.43  Rather, the
occupying power exerted only temporary political and military
authority over the occupied territory, in the manner of a trustee,
pending a return of the legitimate sovereign.' It followed that the
37. Benvenisti, supra note 16, at 26-27.
38. Lassa Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise 432 (Herbert Lauterpacht
ed., 7th ed. 1952).
39. See id. at 433. The first Hague Peace Conference was convened following a
diplomatic circular from Russian Foreign Minister Count Mouravieff in August 1898,
and addressed such issues as the pacific settlement of international disputes and the
codification of the laws and customs of war on land. With respect to the latter issue,
Convention II was motivated by a "desire to diminish the evils of war, so far as
military requirements permits." J6rg Manfred Mbssner, Hague Peace Conferences of
1899 and 1907, in 3 Encyclopedia of Public International Law 204, 205-08 (Rudolf
Bernhardt et al. eds., 1995) (citations omitted). The Second Hague Conference, in
1907, adopted Convention IV on the Laws and Customs of War on Land, which was
nearly identical to Convention II of 1899. Id. at 208-11. For further discussion of the
genesis of the Hague Conferences, see Gerhard von Glahn, The Occupation of
Enemy Territory: A Commentary on the Law and Practice of Belligerent Occupation
7-15 (1957).
40. See Oppenheim, supra note 38, at 433-34.
41. See Benvenisti, supra note 16, at 27; Ernst H. Feilchenfeld, The International
Economic Law of Belligerent Occupation 12 (1942); Edmund H. Schwenk, Legislative
Power of the Military Occupant Under Article 43, Hague Regulations, 54 Yale L.J. 393,
403 (1945).
42. Benvenisti, supra note 16, at 27. Benvenisti notes an eloquent expression of
this doctrine by King William of Prussia who stated on August 11, 1870, "I conduct
war with the French soldiers, not with the French citizens." Id.
43. Oppenheim, supra note 38, at 433-34.
44. See id. Von Glahn points out that the agreement among international scholars
has been that "the legitimate government of the territory retains its sovereignty but
that the latter is suspended during the period of belligerent occupation." Von Glahn,
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occupying power was understood to be under an obligation to protect
a number of interests during its period of temporary rule: its own
military interests, the sovereign rights of the ousted government, and
the interests of the local population against the occupant. 5
These assumptions are clearly reflected in the provisions of the
Hague Regulations. Occupation is defined as territory "actually
placed under the authority of the hostile army."46 The major article
governing occupations, Article 43, states the duties of the occupying
power succinctly:
The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the
hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his
power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and
[civil life], while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in
force in the country.47
There is no transfer of sovereignty here, only an acceptance of the
reality that the legitimate power is temporarily displaced.48  This is
reinforced by Article 45 of the Hague Regulations, which forbids the
occupant from compelling the inhabitants of occupied territory "to
swear allegiance to the hostile Power. '49
Once the authority of the legitimate power has passed to the
occupant, the Regulations impose certain limitations on the power of
the occupant, consistent with the fundamental premise that the
occupier does not gain full sovereignty. The occupying power must,
for example, "take all the measures in his power to restore and
ensure, as far as possible, public order and [civil life]. ' 0 While the
premium is placed on public order, "restore" and "ensure" indicate
the desire of the drafters to maintain the status quo ante, a concern
further expressed by the admonition to respect the "laws in force in
the country."'5' The importance of upholding the established legal
supra note 39, at 31; see also Doris Appel Graber, The Development of the Law of
Belligerent Occupation, 1863-1914, at 66 (1949).
45. See Benvenisti, supra note 16, at 28; Oppenheim, supra note 38, at 434,436-37.
46. Hague Regulations, supra note 12, art. 42, 36 Stat. at 2306.
47. Id. art. 43, at 2306. Schwenk usefully points out that the unofficial English
translation of the original French is deficient with respect to the expression "public
order and safety," which is not a correct translation of the French "vie publique,"
better rendered as "civil life." Schwenk, supra note 41, at 393 n.1. This Note uses
Schwenk's translation.
48. See Michael Bothe, Occupation, Belligerent, in 4 Encyclopedia of Public
International Law 64, 65 (Rudolf Bernhardt et al. eds., 1982) ("International law does
not grant rights to the occupying power, but limits the occupant's exercise of its de
facto powers.").
49. Hague Regulations, supra note 12, art. 45, 36 Stat. at 2306; see generally Major
Richard R. Baxter, The Duty of Obedience to the Belligerent Occupant, 27 Brit. Y.B.
Int'l L. 235, 236-39 (1950) (discussing the theory of the "temporary allegiance" of the
occupied population to the occupant, and relating how Article 45 of the Hague
Regulations made that theory untenable).
50. Benvenisti, supra note 16, at 9 (alteration in original).
51. Hague Regulations, supra note 12, art. 43, 36 Stat. at 2306.
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order in the occupied territory is also expressed elsewhere in the
Regulations, in provisions on tax collection,52 requisitions,53 and
respect for private property. 4 Additionally, the extent of the powers
conferred on the occupant depends on the interpretation of the terms
"unless absolutely prevented,"55 and many of the rights granted to the
occupant are limited to the "needs of the army of occupation."56
Article 55 of the Hague Regulations, which deals with State
property, illustrates both the temporary nature of occupations and the
limited rights conferred upon the occupier: "[T]he occupying state
shall be regarded only as administrator and usufructuary of public
buildings, real estate, forests, and agricultural estates belonging to the
hostile State, and situated in the occupied country. It must safeguard
the capital of these properties, and administer them in accordance
with the rules of usufruct."57
The occupant does not gain title to state property, but merely
obtains possession, and the rules of usufruct prevent using the
property in a wasteful or negligent manner," as the occupant "is not
entitled to exercise the rights of sovereignty."5 9 Legal commentators
have held that Article 55 applies to "immovable" public property.60
Immovables are understood to include "land, permanent structures on
land, buildings, and other appurtenants to the real estate,"6 including
oil, which is of particular importance in Iraq.62 The leading case
concerning the seizure of oil resources during the Second World War
classified oil in the ground as "immovable" for the purpose of Article
52. Id. art. 48, at 2307. This section states:
If, in the territory occupied, the occupant collects the taxes, dues, and tolls
imposed for the benefit of the State, he shall do so, as far as is possible, in
accordance with the rules of assessment and incidence in force, and shall in
consequence be bound to defray the expenses of administration of the
occupied territory to the same extent as the legitimate Government was so
bound.
Id.
53. Id. art. 52, at 2308. Requisitions are not to be demanded from "municipalities
or inhabitants except for the needs of the army of occupation." Id.
54. Id. art. 56, at 2309. All seizure, destruction, or willful damage to private
property, historic monuments, and works of art and science "is forbidden, and should
be made the subject of legal proceedings." Id.
55. Id. art. 43, at 2306.
56. Id. art. 52, at 2308. This is also the case with regard to the seizure of State
cash, arms, means of transport, stores and supplies. Id. art. 53, at 2308.
57. Id. art. 55, at 2309.
58. Oppenheim, supra note 38, at 398.
59. Wheaton's Elements of International Law 539 (Coleman Phillipson ed.,
Stevens & Sons Ltd. 1916) (1836) [hereinafter Wheaton].
60. See id.; Feilchenfeld, supra note 41, at 52; Oppenheim, supra note 38, at 397.
61. Edward R. Cummings, Note, Oil Resources in Occupied Arab Territories
Under the Law of Belligerent Occupation, 9 J. Int'l L. & Econ. 533, 558 (1974).
62. See infra notes 244-57 and accompanying text.
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55.63 Because of the usufructary clause in Article 55, an occupant's
power over immovable state property "is measured not by his own
needs but by the duty to maintain integrity of the corpus."' The
Nuremberg Tribunal recognized that the usufruct provision of Article
55 restricted the taking of immovable property to the military needs of
the army of occupation,65 and commentators have concurred with this
view.66
While the Hague Regulations addressed the authority of the
occupying power, their provisions on the protection of the occupied
population were confined to "family honour and rights, the lives of
persons, and private property, as well as religious convictions and
practice. '67 Oppenheim argued that the complete failure of the Axis
powers to abide by these humanitarian guarantees during the Second
World War indirectly led to the provisions relating to the protection
of civilian populations in the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949,68 the
second major codified source of the law of occupation. Indeed, the
focus of the Convention seems to be less on restrictions of the actions
of government than on the protection of the local population.69 This
was an important departure from the preservation of the sovereign
interests of the occupied state enshrined in the Hague Regulations,
made necessary by both the disregard of the humanitarian provisions
by the Axis powers during the war,7" and the ongoing Allied
occupations of Germany and Japan.71
63. N.V. de Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij v. War Damage Comm'n, 23
I.L.R. 810 (Ct. App., Sing. 1956).
64. Julius Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict 714 (1954).
65. United States v. Flick, 6 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg
Military Tribunals 1187, 1204 (1947). The court found that, with regard to the seizure
of Soviet arms factories:
No single one of the Hague regulations above quoted is exactly in point, but,
adopting the method used by IMT, we deduce from all of them, considered
as a whole, the principle that state-owned property of this character may be
seized and operated for the benefit of the belligerent occupant for the
duration of the occupancy.
Id. at 1210.
66. See Feilchenfeld, supra note 41, at 55; Morris Greenspan, The Modern Law of
Land Warfare 288-89 (1959); Stone, supra note 64, at 714.
67. Hague Regulations, supra note 12, art. 46, 36 Stat. at 2306-07.
68. Oppenheim, supra note 38, at 448-53.
69. See Benvenisti, supra note 16, at 99.
70. During the Second World War, there were many occupations which did not
respect the sovereign rights of the losing state, most notably the abolition of
Czechoslovakia as a State in 1939, the use of "puppet" governments in Norway, and
in Asia, the granting of "independence" by the Japanese to, for example, Burma. See
Benvenisti, supra note 16, at 60-62, 64-66; Roberts, supra note 12, at 252-54.
71. In the occupations of Germany and Japan, the Allies invoked the doctrine of
debellatio, or subjugation, which arises after an unconditional surrender, or the
complete defeat of the opposing power, in order to gain authority to alter the existing
laws in those countries. Roberts, supra note 12, at 267-68. Whether this is a justified
exception to the Hague Regulations or not, it is clearly outside their scope, because
the Regulations impose respect for the laws in force, and seemingly had not
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Hence, Article 47 of the Fourth Geneva Convention committed
itself to a greater protection of the rights of the occupied population
by stating that "[p]rotected persons who are in occupied territory shall
not be deprived, in any case or in any manner whatsoever, of the
benefits of the present Convention by any change introduced, as a
result of the occupation of a territory, into the institutions or
government of the said territory. 7 2  Article 47 simultaneously
provided greater protection to the occupied population, while not
explicitly pronouncing any changes to the institutions of government
of the occupied territory illegal.73 Other articles of the Convention
went into more detail about the treatment of the inhabitants of the
occupied territory, by forbidding mass transfers or deportations,74
detailing certain working conditions for the population,75 ensuring
provision of food and medical supplies,76 and allowing for religious
freedom. 77 In addition to these humanitarian provisions, Article 64 of
the Convention allows the occupying power to "subject the population
of the occupied territory to provisions which are essential to enable
the Occupying Power to fulfill its obligations under the present
Convention" and "to maintain the orderly government of the
territory. '78  Article 64 also states that the "penal laws" of the
occupied territory would remain in force, unless they threatened the
security of the occupying power or the application of the
Convention.79 Finally, Article 154 of the Fourth Geneva Convention
provides that for states that are parties to both the Hague Regulations
and the Fourth Geneva Convention, the Convention is
"supplementary to" the Hague Regulations, creating an area of
overlap between the two sources of the law of occupation.8"
2. The Law of Occupation: Interpretation and Application
As the previous allusions to the Second World War indicate, the
application of the laws of occupation has been "perennially
problematical."81 For example, Article 43 of the Hague Regulations,
which outlines the general rights and obligations of the occupant has
envisioned such a situation. Oppenheim, supra note 38, at 446-47; see also infra notes
112-18 and accompanying text.
72. Geneva Convention, supra note 12, art. 47, 6 U.S.T. at 3548, 75 U.N.T.S. at
318.
73. Benvenisti, supra note 16, at 99.
74. Id. art. 49, 6 U.S.T. at 3548, 75 U.N.T.S. at 318.
75. Id. art. 51, 6 U.S.T. at 3550-52, 75 U.N.T.S. at 320-22.
76. Id. art. 55, 6 U.S.T. at 3552-54, 75 U.N.T.S. at 322-24.
77. Id. art. 58, 6 U.S.T. at 3554, 75 U.N.T.S. at 324.
78. Id. art. 64, 6 U.S.T. at 3558, 75 U.N.T.S. at 328.
79. Id.
80. Id. art. 154, 6 U.S.T. at 3620, 75 U.N.T.S. at 390; see also infra notes 267-72 and
accompanying text.
81. Roberts, supra note 12, at 249.
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been interpreted in various conflicting ways. Two important examples
come from the First World War.
Germany occupied most of Belgium from 1914 until 1918 and
established a "Government General" to run the occupied areas82 in
accordance with the Hague Regulations of 1907.83 One important
preliminary issue concerned the authority of the Government General
to legislate and the concurrent power of the ousted Belgian sovereign
to do the same. 4 The German Government General interpreted
Article 43's transfer of "authority" to the occupant as signifying the
transfer of legislative power for the duration of the occupation.
Consequently, the Government General proceeded to legislate in a
number of areas.86
After the occupation had ended, the Belgian courts strongly
contested this interpretation of the Hague Regulations. The most
famous examples were a series of decisions regarding a German
Order of August 8, 1918, prohibiting the sale of vegetables before they
had been gathered.87 In a challenge to the German order by parties
who had already bargained for this type of exchange, the Court of
Appeal of Liege, citing the Belgian Court of Cassation, reaffirmed the
principle that "the orders of the occupying Power are not laws, but
simply commands of the military authority of the occupant."8 The
Liege Court rejected the contention that the Hague Regulations
conferred upon the occupant the "positive right to legislate."89 The
German order was held to have "no legal value."9
The Hague Regulations were also applied immediately following
the First World War, during the armistice occupation of the
Rhineland, from December 1918 to January 1920, by the allied powers
82. Adolf Solansky, German Administration in Belgium 15-18 (1928).
83. See Benvenisti, supra note 16, at 32-33.
84. The problem was exacerbated by the actions of the Belgian King, who
continued to issue "decree-laws" while he was in exile, creating significant difficulties
for the Belgian courts, both during the occupation itself and once the Germans had
left. See Auditeur Militaire v. G. Van Dieren, 1 Ann. Dig. 445 (Council of War
Brabant, BeIg. 1919) (holding that a decree-law issued by the Belgian government
during the occupation was applicable to Belgian citizens then residing under the
occupation because national sovereignty subsisted in the occupied land during the
occupation).
85. See Benvenisti, supra note 16, at 33; James Wilford Garner, 2 International
Law and the World War 62-63 (1920); J. Pirenne & M. Vauthier, La Ldgislation et
L'administration Allemandes en Belgique 4-5 (1925); Solansky, supra note 82, at 18-
22.
86. See Pirenne & Vauthier, supra note 85, at 21-32, 33-36; Solansky, supra note
82, at 23-25.
87. See Bochart v. Comm. of Supplies of Corneux, 1 Ann. Dig. 462 (Ct. App.
Liege, BeIg. 1920); De Brabant v. T. & A. Florent, 1 Ann. Dig. 463 (Ct. App.
Brussels, Beig. 1920); Mathot v. Longu6, 1 Ann. Dig. 463 (Ct. App. Liege, BeIg.
1921).
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of France, the United Kingdom, the United States and Belgium. 91 The
supreme commander of the operation, Marshal Foch, acknowledged
the applicability of the Hague Regulations to the occupied
Rhineland. 2  Despite this explicit acknowledgment, however, the
economic situation in the area after the devastation of war meant that
the occupying powers took it upon themselves to regulate the
economy of the Rhineland, by imposing trade restrictions with the rest
of Germany and regulating customs duties, with the effect of allowing
the free flow of goods from the Rhineland to France and Belgium.93
The occupations of Belgium and the Rhineland illustrate the
presence of conflicting interpretations of Article 43 of the Hague
Regulations. In the case of Belgium, for example, while the Belgian
courts largely adopted the absolutist position noted above,
international legal scholars seemed to agree that the occupant did
have a limited power to legislate under conditions of absolute
necessity,94 treating the German practice in Belgium as an
aberration.95 In the Rhineland, the Hague Regulations' provisions on
the legislative powers of the occupier were not respected.96 As
Professor Benvenisti argues, these occupations illustrated the
incompatibility of the reality of occupation with the rationale behind
the Hague Regulations. 97 While both of these occupations did end up
as temporary affairs, neither occupying power restricted their actions
to what commentators have viewed as absolute necessity.98
Beyond the general limitation to respect the "laws in force in the
country," 99 the Hague Regulations are silent regarding fundamental
constitutional change by the occupying power. The Fourth Geneva
Convention, for its part, sidesteps the issue by focusing on the
treatment of the local population, without passing judgment on "any
change introduced, as a result of the occupation of a territory, into the
institutions or government of the said territory."1" However, because
the occupying power does not gain sovereignty by occupation, a
change in fundamental institutions does not seem to be envisioned by
the Hague Regulations. 1' This interpretation was not followed by
91. See Benvenisti, supra note 16, at 48.
92. Id. at 49.
93. Id. at 50-52.
94. For an overview of these scholars' views, see Schwenk, supra note 41, at 400.
Another scholar limits the right of abrogating existing laws or promulgating new ones
to the "exigencies of war." Greenspan, supra note 66, at 224.
95. Benvenisti, supra note 16, at 46; Feilchenfeld, supra note 41, at 22 n.2; 2
Garner, supra note 85, at 88-89.
96. Benvenisti, supra note 16, at 48-52.
97. Id. at 57.
98. See supra note 94.
99. Hague Regulations, supra note 12, art. 43, 36 Stat. at 2306.
100. Geneva Convention, supra note 12, art. 47, 6 U.S.T. at 3548, 75 U.N.T.S. at
318.
101. See Feilchenfeld, supra note 41, at 89; Stone, supra note 64, at 698-99.
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Germany during its occupation of Belgium, when it tried to alter the
political structure of the country by increasing the power of the
Flemish speaking population, culminating in the division of Belgium
into two separate administrations, with Brussels becoming the capital
of Flanders. 2
While Article 43 of the Hague Regulations is the "miniconstitution"
of the law of occupation, 03 Article 55 is a far more specific provision
dealing with public property in the occupied territory, which the
occupier must administer according to the rules of usufruct.' 14 But
this Article, and its extension to "immovable" public property,
including natural resources, has similarly competed with the reality of
the actions of occupying powers.105
During the occupation of Belgium, the German Governor General
established the Central Coal Office, which set prices and organized
distribution, mainly to the benefit of the German war effort,"0 6 while
prewar coal production in Belgium had been inadequate to even
provide for internal Belgian demand."7 During the Second World
War, the Japanese seized oil resources throughout the East Indies,
and a Singapore court found that seizure of oil "not merely for the
purpose of meeting the requirements of an army of occupation but for
the purpose of supplying the naval, military and civilian needs of
Japan, both at home and abroad" violated the laws of war.10 8
Moreover, when Israel occupied the Sinai peninsula following the
1967 war, it exploited several oil fields and increased their production
substantially, partly for domestic consumption. 109
102. Pirenne & Vauthier, supra note 82, at 87-93 (outlining the progression of
German policy by instituting language reforms in the higher education system before
separating Flanders and Wallonia administratively); Solansky, supra note 85, at 166-
81.
103. Benvenisti, supra note 16, at 9.
104. Hague Regulations, supra note 12, art. 55, 36 Stat. at 2309.
105. Stone, supra note 64, at 727-32.
106. Solansky, supra note 82, at 83-86.
107. Pirenne & Vauthier, supra note 85, at 43.
108. N.V. de Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij v. War Damage Comm'n, 23
I.L.R. 810, 821 (Ct. App., Sing. 1956).
109. Cummings, supra note 61, at 534-35. The legality of this oil exploitation has
been the subject of a debate about the application of Article 55 of the Hague
Regulations. Allan Gerson has argued that Israel's use of oil was not contrary to the
usufructary provisions of Article 55 of the Regulations, for it in fact increased the
value of the Sinai peninsula. Allan Gerson, Note, Off-Shore Oil Exploration By a
Belligerent Occupant: The Gulf of Suez Dispute, 71 Am. J. Int'l L. 725, 732-33 (1977).
A contrary view is expressed by Clagett and Johnson, who argue that Israel violated
Article 55, and that such a violation could not be justified by the costs of occupation.
Brice M. Clagett & 0. Thomas Johnson, Jr., May Israel as a Belligerent Occupant
Lawfully Exploit Previously Unexploited Oil Resources of the Gulf of Suez?, 72 Am. J.
Int'l L. 558, 584-85 (1978). The consensus seems to be the position taken by
Cummings, that "an occupying power does not have a right to exploit from an area...
where oil resources were not exploited prior to commencement of the occupation."
Cummings, supra note 61, at 533; see also R. Dobie Langenkamp & Rex J. Zedalis,
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Commentators have struggled with the problems associated with
the application of the Hague Regulations in this context after the
Second World War.1 ' All the major powers failed to respect the laws
of occupation during that conflict,"' but what was perhaps most
striking was the exception to the Hague Regulations invoked by the
Allies during their post-war occupations in Japan and Germany.
During military operations, the Allied powers openly stated their
objectives as the "unconditional surrender" of Nazi Germany and
Imperial Japan, which was understood as the "destruction of a
philosophy in Germany ... and Japan which is based on the conquest
and subjugation of other peoples.""' 2 Such an objective required
fundamental political and institutional changes, which are clearly not
within the scope of Article 43 of the Hague Regulations.' 3
The Allies adopted the view that the Hague Regulations did not
apply to the occupations of Germany and Japan. They based this view
on the customary international law theory of debellatio, or
subjugation, which refers to a situation in which a party to the conflict
has been defeated to the extent that it has essentially ceased to exist.114
In such a situation, the territory of the previous state is not
"occupied," and the Hague Regulations do not apply, because they
apparently did not envisage this sort of stateless situation."5 Although
by no means uncontested in academic literature,' 16 this was the view
adopted at the time by Allied courts in Germany and national courts
elsewhere. 7 This view permitted the Allies to make fundamental
What Happens to the Iraqi Oil?: Thoughts on Some Significant, Unexamined
International Legal Questions Regarding Occupation of Oil Fields, 14 Eur. J. Int'l L.
417,418-20 (2003).
110. See Roberts supra note 12, at 249; Michel Veuthey, Gudrilla et Droit
Humanitaire 355 (2d ed. 1983).
111. Benvenisti, supra note 16, at 96.
112. Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Washington,
1941-1942, and Casablanca, 1943, at 837 (1968).
113. Hague Regulations, supra note 12, art. 43, 36 Stat. at 2306.
114. See Roberts, supra note 12, at 267-68.
115. See Oppenheim, supra note 38, at 445-47.
116. For a comprehensive overview of the legal debate on this matter, see Theodor
Schweisfurth, Germany, Occupation After World War II, in 3 Encyclopedia of Public
International Law 191, 196-98 (1982).
117. See, e.g., In re Alstotter, 14 Ann. Dig. 278 (U.S. Mil. Trib., Nuremberg,
Germany 1947) (finding that because of the complete breakdown of government,
industry, agriculture and supply, the Hague Convention and its restrictions did not
apply, as the occupying powers were under an imperative humanitarian duty outside
the scope of the Regulations); In re Bauerle, 15 Ann. Dig. 292 (Ct. App. Colmar, Fr.
1948) (holding that the German capitulation deprived Germany of sovereignty);
Dalldorf v. Dir. of Prosecutions, 16 Ann. Dig. 435,437-38 (Control Comm'n Ct. App.,
British Zone of Germany 1949) (noting that the Hague Regulations do not apply to
the occupation of Germany because of the complete collapse of the German
government in May 1945); In re Flesche, 16 Ann. Dig. 266, 267-68 (Special Crim. Ct.,
Amsterdam, Neth. 1949) (holding that the end of the war by debellatio signified that
the Allies had assumed "supreme authority" over Germany).
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changes to German and Japanese political, institutional and economic
organization, clearly outside the ambit of the Hague Regulations."i
The cases of Germany and Japan were thus theoretically placed
outside the area occupied by the Hague Regulations. Since the
Second World War and the promulgation of the Geneva Conventions,
occupying powers have not adhered to either the Hague Regulations'
or the Fourth Geneva Convention's provisions on the law of
occupation.119 As Benvenisti points out, the Israeli occupation of
territories following the 1967 war was the only instance in post-Second
World War history where an occupying power actually established a
military government for occupied territories, in accord with the
provisions of the law of occupation. ° In contrast, other instances of
what may informally be called "occupations" in the post-1945 world
have been justified on a number of grounds, all outside the scope of
the law of occupation. 121 Thus the Indonesian takeover of East Timor
in 1975,122 the Moroccan annexation of Western Sahara in the mid
1970s, 123 and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990124 were all conducted
as annexations, and were not treated by those powers as
occupations.125 Other cases, such as the Vietnamese occupation of
Cambodia in 1978,26 the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979,127
and the U.S. actions in Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989128 were
conducted under the guises of assistance to the indigenous
governments. 129  In none of these cases did the occupants view
themselves as a formal occupying power, and none of them attempted
to apply either the Hague Regulations or the Geneva Conventions, or
118. See Schweisfurth, supra note 116, at 192-96.
119. See Robbie Sabel, The Problematic Fourth Geneva Convention: Rethinking
the International Law of Occupation, at
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/forumnewl20.php (last visited February 11, 2004).
120. Benvenisti, supra note 16, at 107.
121. Id. at 149.
122. See East Timor and the International Community: Basic Documents 44-52
(Heike Krieger ed., 1997); Jennifer Toole, Note, A False Sense of Security: Lessons
Learned from the United Nations Organization and Conduct Mission in East Timor, 16
Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 199, 208-09 (2000).
123. See Thomas M. Franck & Paul Hoffman, The Right of Self-Determination in
Very Small Places, 8 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 331, 337-42 (1976).
124. See generally Iraq and Kuwait: The Hostilities and Their Aftermath (M.
Weller ed., 1993).
125. See Benvenisti, supra note 16, at 149; Peter Wallensteen, Global Patterns of
Conflict and the Role of Third Parties, 67 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1409, 1411 (1992).
126. See Benvenisti, supra note 16, at 164-66; Chang Pao-Min, Kampuchea
Between China and Vietnam (1985).
127. See J. Bruce Amstutz, Afghanistan: The First Five Years of Soviet
Occupation 40-45 (1986).
128. See William C. Gilmore, The Grenada Intervention: Analysis and
Documentation 37-74 (1984); Max Hilaire, International Law and the United States
Military Intervention in the Western Hemisphere 80-82, 115-23 (1997).
129. See Amstutz, supra note 127, at 42-49; Hilaire, supra note 128, at 127.
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even appeal to an exception thereto, such as the customary
international law doctrine of debellatio.3°
B. United Nations Governance
An alternative model for the governance of post-conflict societies
that has emerged much more recently than the law of occupation is
that of United Nations governance of territories. The absence of a
clear corpus of formal international law to govern such a situation
may account for the recent emergence of this trend, although
undoubtedly certain geopolitical factors stemming from the end of the
Cold War emboldened the United Nations to expand the application
of its Charter's Chapter VII powers. Another important impetus for
the rise of this alternative model was the phenomenon of
decolonization, by which candidate states for occupation themselves
became unstable states with novel claims to sovereignty,"' replacing
the traditional Hague model of established sovereign states.132
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter addresses action with
respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of
aggression.133 Under Article 39, any action by the Security Council
under Chapter VII is based on a determination of "any threat to the
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression. ' 134  The Security
Council enjoys a certain amount of discretion in determining which
actions fall under Article 39.135
Once this threshold requirement has been satisfied, the Security
Council may take action under the other articles of Chapter VII,
including provisional measures,"' measures "not involving the use of
armed force," '137 or action by "air, sea, or land forces., 138 Article 41 is
the most pertinent with regard to the governance of post-conflict
situations, as it empowers the Security Council to take measures "not
involving the use of armed force" to give effect to its decisions, and
details that these measures "may include complete or partial
interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal,
telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the
severance of diplomatic relations. ' 139 It is clear from the wording, and
130. See Benvenisti, supra note 16, at 182.
131. See, e.g., Antonio Cassese, Wars of National Liberation and Humanitarian
Law, in Studies and Essays on International Humanitarian Law and Red Cross
Principles in Honour of Jean Pictet 313 (Christophe Swinarski ed., 1984).
132. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
133. U.N. Charter ch. VII.
134. Id. art. 39.
135. 1 The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary 719 (Bruno Simma et
al. eds., 2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter Charter Commentary].
136. U.N. Charter art. 40.
137. Id. art. 41.
138. Id. art. 42.
139. Id. art. 41.
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further established by usage, that this list of measures is not
exhaustive,14 ° and Article 41 has been used, for example, to create
international criminal tribunals.14' Furthermore, Article 48 permits
delegation of the action to be carried out under Chapter VII by the
Security Council to "some" members of the United Nations, 42
opening up the possibility of delegating "action" to a few member
states or a regional organization. 143  Despite the clear breadth of
powers granted to the United Nations under Article 41, however,
these powers were exercised only twice during the Cold War period,'"
for obvious geopolitical reasons. 145  Most importantly, U.N.
governance did not emerge as a viable option without the consent of
the state in question until the 1990s.
U.N. governance of post-conflict societies may be broadly
categorized according to the manner in which such governance was
legally justified. Thus, a first category is restricted to actions under
the international trusteeship system of Chapter XII of the Charter,
which entails the granting of a trusteeship for a specific territory to
fully developed States acting as trustees. 146 The territories concerned
were essentially non-self-governing and administered temporarily as
trusteeships under U.N. auspices.'47 A second category of U.N.
governance is based on the consent of the parties, either sovereign
states or factions within sovereign states.148  The third category of
U.N. governance is that based on Chapter VII powers of the United
Nations, more specifically an expansive interpretation of Article 41's
measures not involving the use of armed force. 149
The United Nations organized certain trusteeships for residual
League of Nations mandates, territories "detached from enemy states
as a result of the Second World War," and territories "voluntarily
140. 1 Charter Commentary, supra note 135, at 740.
141. Id. at 743.
142. U.N. Charter art. 48. The Article reads in full:
(1) The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for
the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the
Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council
may determine.
(2) Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United
Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate international
agencies of which they are members.
Id.
143. 1 Charter Commentary, supra note 135, at 777.
144. The exercise of power occurred during the embargo on Southern Rhodesia in
1966 and during the arms embargo on South Africa in 1977. Id. at 738.
145. See N. D. White, Keeping the Peace: The United Nations and the
Maintenance of International Peace and Security 8-27 (2d ed. 1997) (describing the
importance of the veto in Security Council deliberations during the Cold War years).
146. U.N. Charter arts. 75-85.
147. 2 Charter Commentary, supra note 135, at 1099.
148. See Ruffert, supra note 30, at 616.
149. 1 Charter Commentary, supra note 135, at 743.
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placed" under the trusteeship system.15 ° However, its role did not
include governance, which was left to the state granted the
trusteeship. 5' Trusteeship has since been shelved, and the trusteeship
council suspended,152 mainly because of the provision in Article 78
that the trusteeship system cannot apply to members of the United
Nations,153 which now numbers 191 countries, compared to the 51
Charter members of the United Nations in 1945.54 The first cases of
direct U.N. governance of a territory were thus based on the consent
of the parties involved, which did not require a Chapter VII
determination of a threat to international peace or security. 155
The first direct U.N. governance of a territory was the United
Nations Temporary Executive Authority ("UNTEA"), which
governed Irian Jaya, the western half of New Guinea, for seven
months in 1962-1963, during its transition from Dutch to Indonesian
rule. 56  This U.N. administration was created pursuant to an
agreement between Indonesia and the Netherlands, which included
each nation's consent to a temporary U.N. administration. 157 Under
the Dutch-Indonesian agreement, the head of UNTEA was given
general powers, or "full authority under the direction of the Secretary-
General to administer the territory.' 1
58
In practice, for the short period of U.N. administration, U.N.
officials replaced Dutch officials before power was handed over to
Indonesia. 159 This experience was not used as precedent until thirty
years later, when the United Nations was handed significant powers of
civil administration over Cambodia after the demise of the Khmer
Rouge regime."6 This authority came within the scope of the 1991
Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Conflict in
Cambodia. 61 The agreement created a representative institution of
150. U.N. Charter art. 77.
151. See, e.g., 2 Charter Commentary, supra note 135, at 1099.
152. Id. at 1129.
153. U.N. Charter art. 78.
154. For a review of the members of the United Nations from 1945 to the present
day see http://www.un.org/Overview/growth.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2004).
155. See Matheson, supra note 23, at 77; Ruffert, supra note 30, at 616.
156. Agreement Concerning West New Guinea (West Irian), Aug. 15, 1962,
Indon.-Neth., 437 U.N.T.S. 273, 274; see also Thomas M. Franck, Nation Against
Nation: What Happened to the U.N. Dream and What the U.S. Can Do About It 79
(1985).
157. See Franck, supra note 156, at 79.
158. Agreement Concerning West New Guinea (West Irian), supra note 156, art.
V.
159. Franck, supra note 156, at 79-82.
160. See Michael W. Doyle, UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC's Civil
Mandate 16-24 (1995).
161. Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia
Conflict, Oct. 23, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 183 (1992) [hereinafter Cambodia Conflict]. See




the four major warring factions, the "Supreme National Council,"
which delegated certain important functions to the United Nations
Transitional Authority in Cambodia ("UNTAC"). 62 These functions
included UNTAC's direct control over all "administrative agencies,
bodies and offices" acting in the field of "foreign affairs, national
defence, finance, public security and information," "supervision or
control" over any other governmental bodies which "could directly
influence the outcome of elections," and the right to investigate other
bodies.163 Importantly, the authority of the U.N. in this instance was
based on the consent of the Cambodian factions, not on Chapter VII
powers.164
By contrast, U.N. governance in Kosovo and East Timor was based
explicitly on the United Nations exercising its Chapter VII powers. In
Kosovo, following the NATO campaign in 1999,16 the economic and
social outlook was bleak at best."6 The displacement of hundreds of
thousands of refugees, vast material destruction, continuing ethnic
resentment, and the abandonment of Kosovo by Serb authorities had
left the province on the edge of collapse. 6  The international
community reacted to the situation with a series of diplomatic
meetings that culminated in the Security Council adopting Resolution
1244, which was binding under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. 61
The Resolution authorized deployment of both "international civil
and security presences" under U.N. auspices, following a finding that
the situation in the region constituted a "threat to international peace
and security.' ' 169 The rationale behind the exertion of these Chapter
VII powers was the fulfillment of the "purposes" and "principles" of
the U.N. Charter, concern for the humanitarian tragedy in Kosovo,
and the reaffirmation of the need for "substantial autonomy and
meaningful self-administration for Kosovo."' 0
While the mission of the international security presence
corresponded with previous U.N. deployments charged with restoring
162. Ratner, supra note 161, at 9-12.
163. Cambodia Conflict, supra note 161, art. 6, at 184-45.
164. See Ratner, supra note 161, at 9.
165. See generally Christine M. Chinkin, Kosovo: A "Good" or "Bad" War?, 93
Am. J. Int'l L. 841 (1999); Richard A. Falk, Kosovo, World Order, and the Future of
International Law, 93 Am. J. Int'l L. 847 (1999); Ruth Wedgwood, NATO's Campaign
in Yugoslavia, 93 Am. J. Int'l L. 828 (1999).
166. See The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo
Report (2000) [hereinafter The Kosovo Report]; Report of the Secretary-General on
the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, U.N. Doc. S/1999/779
(July 12, 1999), available at http://ods-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/204/10/PDF/N9920410.pdf?OpenElement
[hereinafter Report of the Secretary-General on Kosovo].
167. The Kosovo Report, supra note 166, at 5-9; Report of the Secretary-General
on Kosovo, supra note 166.
168. S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 29.
169. Id. at 2.
170. Id.
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order and enforcing a ceasefire, 17' the international civil presence was
charged with a more complex-and unprecedented-task, justified
under Article 41 of the Charter's language concerning "measures not
involving the use of armed force.1 72 This was institutionalized by the
request, in the resolution, for the Secretary-General to appoint a
Special Representative to "control the implementation of the
international civil presence." '173 The Secretary-General then created
the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
("UNMIK"), which was led by the Special Representative. 17 4
The structure of UNMIK was unique, in that different functions
were Under the supervision of different international bodies including
non-U.N. institutions albeit under general U.N. auspices, as permitted
by Article 48 of the Charter. 75 Civil administration was led by the
United Nations, with powers over public administration, police, and
judicial affairs;1 76 the promotion of democratization and institution
building was led by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe ("OCSE"); 17 7 the humanitarian component was led by the
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees1 78 and the reconstruction
component was headed by the European Union.179
The powers of the Special Representative over the administration
of Kosovo were detailed in the first UNMIK regulation, which stated
that "[a]ll legislative and executive authority with respect to Kosovo,
including the administration of the judiciary, is vested in UNMIK and
is exercised by the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General."'8 ° The applicable laws in Kosovo were the domestic "laws
applicable in the territory of Kosovo prior to 24 March 1999...
insofar as they do not conflict with" UNMIK's mandate or any
UNMIK regulations."' The Special Representative repealed certain
portions of previous legislation covering property and housing 82 that
171. See The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-Keeping 3-8
(United Nations Dept. of Pub. Info., 1985).
172. U.N. Charter art. 41; 1 Charter Commentary, supra note 135, at 743-45.
173. S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 29, at 2.
174. UNMIK, Regulation on the Authority of the Interim Administration in
Kosovo, UNMIK/REG/1999/1 (July 25, 1999), available at
http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/1999/reg0l-99.htm.
175. See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.




180. UNMIK, Regulation on the Authority of the Interim Administration in
Kosovo, UNMIK/REG/1999/1 (July 25, 1999), available at
http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/1999/reg0l-99.htm.
181. Id.
182. UNMIK, Regulation on the Repeal of Discriminatory Legislation Affecting
Housing and Rights in Property, UNMIK/REG1999/10 (Oct. 13, 1999), available at
http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/1999/reglO-99.htm.
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were found discriminatory,183 and made new laws on subjects ranging
from banks184 and currency use1 8 to conditions for the importation of
petroleum products.186
The experience of UNMIK in Kosovo was replicated in East Timor.
East Timor had been under Portuguese rule until 1975, when it was
annexed by Indonesia. 87 In 1999, after years of fruitless negotiations,
the Portuguese and Indonesian governments asked the United
Nations Secretary-General to conduct a referendum of the East
Timorese, with the choices being either independence, or autonomy
within Indonesia.'88 Following the rejection of autonomy within
Indonesia, militia groups initiated a campaign of violence and
destruction that created large numbers of refugees.189
The United Nations response was twofold. First, under its Chapter
VII powers, it authorized the deployment of a multinational force, the
183. Id.
184. UNMIK, Regulation on Bank Licensing, Supervision and Regulation,
UNMIK/REG/1999/21 (Nov. 15, 1999) (giving sole responsibility for the issuance of
licenses to banks and financial institutions to the Banking and Payments Authority of
Kosovo), available at http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/1999/reg2l-99.htm.
185. UNMIK, Regulation on the Currency Permitted to Be Used in Kosovo,
UNMIK/REG/1999/4 (Sept. 2, 1999), available at
http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/1999/reg04-99.htm. The regulation provides,
in part:
The budgets, financial records and accounts of all physical and legal persons,
including private enterprises, public bodies, agencies or institutions and
UNMIK shall be made in a currency or currencies designated in accordance
with an administrative direction promulgated by the Special Representative
of the Secretary-General ....
Id.
186. UNMIK, Regulation on the Importation, Transport, Distribution and Sale of
Petroleum Products (Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants or POL) for and in Kosovo,
UNMIK/REG/1999/9 (Sept. 20, 1999) (providing that "[a]ny person or enterprise
engaging in the importation, transport, distribution and sale of any or all petroleum
products ... for and in Kosovo, will be required to obtain a license from the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General"), available at
http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/19991reg09-99.htm.
187. See East Timor and the International Community: Basic Documents, supra
note 122, at 44-52; East Timor-UNTAET Background, at
http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/UntaetB.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2004).
188. Matheson, supra note 23, at 81-83; East Timor-UNTAET Background, supra
note 187; see also S.C. Res. 1246, U.N. SCOR, 4013th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/1246
(1999). The resolution decided to
establish until 31 August 1999 the United Nations Mission in East Timor
(UNAMET) to organize and conduct a popular consultation, scheduled for
August 8, 1999, on the basis of a direct, secret and universal ballot, in order
to ascertain whether the East Timorese people accept the proposed
constitutional framework providing for a special autonomy for East Timor
within the unitary Republic of Indonesia or reject the proposed special
autonomy for East Timor ....
Id. at 2.
189. See Matheson, supra note 23, at 81-83; Joel C. Beauvais, Note, Benevolent
Despotism: A Critique of U.N. State-Building in East Timor, 33 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. &
Pol. 1101, 1108-11 (2001); East Timor-UNTAET Background, supra note 187.
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International Force for East Timor, to restore order and ensure
humanitarian assistance.' 90  Second, influenced by the "grave
humanitarian situation" and the existence of a "threat to peace and
security," the Security Council adopted Resolution 1272, which
established, pursuant to Chapter VII powers, the United Nations
Transitional Administration in East Timor ("UNTAET").' 9' The
Resolution gave UNTAET "overall responsibility for the
administration of East Timor," including "all legislative and executive
authority, including the administration of justice.' ' 192 Much like in
Kosovo, UNTAET was led by a Special Representative of the
Secretary-General, 93 who, once appointed, promulgated a regulation
reaffirming his powers and establishing that existing domestic law
would apply in East Timor unless it conflicted with Resolution 1272 or
UNTAET regulations.'94 Additionally, the Special Representative
repealed a series of Indonesian security laws,195 abolished capital
punishment, 96 and subsequently exercised his vast legislative powers
in areas including taxation, 97 currency, 98 the appointment of judicial
officers, 199 and telecommunications regulation.200
United Nations governance in Kosovo and East Timor therefore
allowed the Representative of the Secretary-General rather broad
190. S.C. Res. 1264, U.N. SCOR, 4045th mtg., U.N. Doc S/Res/1264 (1999). The
Resolution authorized the establishment of a
multinational force under a unified command structure, pursuant to the
request of the Government of Indonesia conveyed to the Secretary-General
on 12 September 1999, with the following tasks: to restore peace and
security in East Timor, to protect and support UNAMET in carrying out its
tasks and, within force capabilities, to facilitate humanitarian assistance
operations.
Id. at2.
191. S.C. Res. 1272, supra note 29, at 2.
192. Id.
193. UNTAET, Regulation on the Authority of the Transitional Administration in
East Timor, UNTAET/REG/1999/1 (1999), available at
http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/untaetR/etregl.htm.
194. Id. § 3.1.
195. Id. § 3.2.
196. Id. § 3.3.
197. UNTAET, Regulation on a Provisional Tax and Customs Regime for East
Timor, UNTAET/REG/2000/12 (2000) (establishing a tax system for East Timor
under the direct authority of the Special Representative), available at
http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/untaetR/Regl2.pdf.
198. UNTAET, Regulation on the Establishment of a Legal Tender for East
Timor, UNTAET/REG/2000/7 (2000) (establishing the U.S. dollar as the official
currency of East Timor), available at
http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/untaetR/Reg007E.pdf.
199. UNTAET, Regulation on the Establishment of a Transitional Judicial Service
Commission, UNTAET/REG/1999/3 (1999) (creating a commission under the
authority of the Special Representative to appoint judges and prosecutors), available
at http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/untaetR/etreg3.htm.
200. UNTAET, Regulation on the Establishment of an Authority for the
Regulation of Telecommunications in East Timor, UNTAET/REG/2001/15 (2001),
available at http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/untaetR/2001-15.pdf.
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powers 2 1 compared to the restrictions imposed on an occupying
power by the law of occupation. 22 This observation has important
consequences in present-day Iraq, where the application of either
body of law could potentially create different outcomes during the
occupation or possible U.N. governance.
Thus, Part II of this Note will analyze the application of both the
law of occupation and the U.N. governance model in Iraq, by focusing
on the rationales behind these bodies of law and the stated objectives
of the U.S.-led occupation in Iraq. Two objectives will be of particular
concern: the rebuilding of the oil industry, and the establishment of
democratic institutions.
II. APPLYING THE LAW IN IRAQ
Both the law of occupation and any potential United Nations
governance scheme would face unique challenges in their application
in Iraq, where U.S. and allied forces currently occupy the country.
Certainly, the application of these bodies of law would be problematic
in any environment, but the situation in Iraq provides a contemporary
example of specific problems that the potential application of such
laws may face.
The first challenge stemming from the application of the law of
occupation in Iraq involves the fundamental discrepancy that exists
between the rationales and assumptions underlying the law of
occupation as codified, and the stated goals of the American-led
occupation in Iraq, namely the restoration of sovereignty to the Iraqi
people.0 3 While the law of occupation is ancillary to the laws of war
and predicated on the temporary transfer of authority to the occupant
pending the return of the defeated sovereign,2°  the current
occupation of Iraq is explicitly aimed at changing the fundamental
nature of the Iraqi state.0 5
Beyond such theoretical concerns, however, lies the challenge of
understanding how the application of the law of occupation as
currently understood would allow the CPA to achieve its goals-
rebuilding the oil industry and allowing the Iraqi people to freely
determine their political future-given the restrictions imposed on the
occupying power by the Hague Regulations, notably in Articles 43
201. See Hansj6rg Strohmeyer, Collapse and Reconstruction of a Judicial System:
The United Nations Missions in Kosovo and East Timor, 95 Am. J. Int'l L. 46, 46-48
(2001) (pointing out the powers of UNTAET and UNMIK in reconstructing a judicial
system for Kosovo and East Timor).
202. See supra notes 51-80 and accompanying text.
203. L. Paul Bremer III, Editorial, Iraq's Path to Sovereignty, Wash. Post, Sept. 8,
2003, at A21; S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 8, at 1.
204. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
205. See infra notes 211-13 and accompanying text.
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and 55.206 The alternative model presented here, that of United
Nations governance, would have to face an inquiry as to the
application of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to the
situation in Iraq, 07 and then a determination of how much power
such a scheme would need to create democratic institutions in Iraq.
Each body of law would provide a different set of rights and
responsibilities for the occupant or territorial administrator, which in
the specific case of Iraq would result in different implications for the
achievement of the present occupation's stated goals.
A. Problems of Applying the Law of Occupation in Iraq
The stated aims of the CPA in Iraq have led certain scholars to
question the relevance of the law of occupation to such post-conflict
circumstances.2 °8 Indeed, as Benvenisti and other commentators have
argued, the law of occupation seems to have been honored primarily
by its breach,2"9 and the sudden resurrection of this body of law by the
United Nations2 0 raises specific questions about how it can be used to
fulfill the United States' aims in Iraq.
These aims have been clearly set out by both the Bush
administration and the CPA. President George W. Bush, in his
address aboard the American aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln on
May 1, 2003, stated that there remained "difficult work" to do in Iraq,
and signaled that one of the overriding concerns for that country
would be "the transition from dictatorship to democracy. 21 1 This goal
has been the central aspect of President Bush's pronouncements on
Iraq, reaffirmed in a joint declaration with British Prime Minster Tony
Blair on November 20, 2003, which stated that "[t]he United States
and United Kingdom stand ready to support the Transitional
206. See supra notes 47-67 and accompanying text.
207. See Ruffert, supra note 30, at 617 (arguing that "peace" for the purposes of
Chapter VII may be related to the security situation within a state).
208. See Sabel, supra note 119; David J. Scheffer, Beyond Occupation Law, 97 Am.
J. Int'l L. 842 (2003). Scheffer's is perhaps the most damning indictment of the law of
occupation in Iraq, arguing that it cannot adequately deal with the political, economic,
and humanitarian challenges present in Iraq. Id. at 858-59.
209. Eyal Benvenisti, The Security Council and the Law on Occupation: Resolution
1483 on Iraq in Historical Perspective, 23 Isr. Def. Forces L. Rev. 1, 17 (2003).
Benvenisti adopts a position that appears contrary to that of Scheffer, as he argues
that the law of occupation has retained its efficiency despite serious challenges,
although he acknowledges the important changes to the law of occupation that were
necessary to its application in Iraq, including the provisions of Security Council
Resolution 1483. Id. at 21-22; see also Sabel, supra note 119.
210. S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 8, at 1; see supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
211. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, President Bush Announces Major
Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended (May 1, 2003), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/iraq/20030501-15.html.
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Administration in its task of building a new Iraq and its democratic
institutions. "212
While the White House has pushed the transition to democracy, the
CPA has dealt with the more practical aspects of the occupation. In
his first regulation as leader of the CPA, Ambassador Bremer stated
that the goals of the CPA included restoring security, facilitating
economic recovery and reconstruction, as well as allowing the Iraqi
people to freely determine their political future. 213  To further this
mission, and pursuant to the vesting of all executive, legislative, and
judicial authority in the CPA,214 Bremer has issued orders regarding
the management and use of Iraqi public property,1 5 the status of
coalition forces and their contractors,1 6 the liberalization of trade
policy,217 and the establishment of a ministry of science and
technology.218
Both the general aims and the specific measures outlined above are
seemingly reinforced by United Nations Security Council Resolution
1483, which explicitly calls on the CPA "to promote the welfare of the
Iraqi people through the effective administration of the territory,
including in particular working towards the restoration of conditions
of security and stability and the creation of conditions in which the
212. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, Declaration on Iraq by President
George W. Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair (Nov. 20, 2003), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031120-l.html. The declaration
further stated that "[i]t is right that Iraqis are making these decisions and for the first
time in generations determining their own future. We welcome the Governing
Council's commitment to ensuring the widest possible participation in the
Transitional Assembly and constitutional process." Id.
213. Coalition Provisional Authority, Regulation Number 1, CPA/REG/16 May
2003/01, available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/REG1.pdf.
214. Id.
215. Coalition Provisional Authority, Order Number 9, CPA/ORD/08 June
2003/09, available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/CPAORD9.pdf. The order
applies to the occupancy, use, management, and assignment of public property by the
CPA, Iraqi ministries, as well as property temporarily made available to private
individuals or organizations, including commercial enterprises, all of which have to be
entered into the Register of Public Property of the CPA. Id.
216. Coalition Provisional Authority, Order Number 17, CPA/ORD/26 June
2003/17, available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/CPAORD17Status-
ofForces.pdf. The order immunizes CPA personnel, coalition forces, their property,
funds, and assets from the Iraqi legal process and also extends this immunity to
contractors with respect to contractual claims. Id.
217. Coalition Provisional Authority, Order Number 12, CPA/ORD/7 June
2003/12, available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/CPAORD12.pdf. In
"[r]ecognizing the central role of international trade in Iraq's recovery and its
development of a free market economy," the order suspends "[a]ll tariffs, customs
duties, import taxes, licensing fees, and similar surcharges for goods entering or
leaving Iraq." Id. (emphasis omitted).
218. Coalition Provisional Authority, Order Number 24, CPA/ORD/13 August
2003/24 (dissolving the Ministry of Atomic Energy and establishing the Ministry of
Science and Technology), available at http://www.cpa-
iraq.org/regulations/20030901_024_Min_ofScienceTechnology-24AUG03.pdf
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Iraqi people can freely determine their own political future. ' 219 The
CPA quoted this language almost verbatim in its first regulation,220
and has used it as a basis of authority to promulgate subsequent
orders and regulations.221 Resolution 1483, however, in its very next
operative paragraph, calls upon all the concerned parties to comply
fully with their obligations under international law, "in particular the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Hague Regulations of 1907.222
It is therefore unclear whether Resolution 1483 was intended to
confer authority on the CPA beyond that available under the laws of
occupation.223
On a theoretical level, Professor David Scheffer has argued that the
law of occupation appears to be particularly "unsuited" for the radical
changes envisioned by both the United Nations Security Council and
the CPA in Iraq.224 Indeed, as discussed in Part I.A. of this Note, the
law of occupation is based on certain assumptions drawn directly from
the experience of the late nineteenth century,225 including the key
understanding that because war is a conflict solely between two
226sovereigns, any resulting occupation should be a temporary
situation, without any transfer of sovereignty to the occupying power
or even to a new regime in the occupied state.227 The Hague
Regulations embody these assumptions and codify them into a set of
specific restrictions and responsibilities for the occupying power.228
Most notably, Article 43 of the Hague Regulations imposes upon the
occupying power the responsibility to "take all the measures in his
power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and [civil
life], while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in
the country. '229 The laws of the occupied state therefore cannot be
changed, unless the occupier is "absolutely prevented" from doing
so. 230  Furthermore, the Hague Regulations appear to be the final
219. S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 8, at 2.
220. Coalition Provisional Authority, Regulation Number 1, CPA/REG/16 May
2003/01, available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/REG1.pdf.
221. See, e.g., Coalition Provisional Authority, Order Number 24, CPA/ORD/13
August 2003/24, available at http://www.cpa-
iraq.org/regulations/20030901_024_Min of ScienceTechnology_24AUG03.pdf.
Practically all CPA orders and regulations signed by Ambassador Bremer
include a paragraph in their preamble claiming legitimacy "[p]ursuant to my authority
as Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority ... and under the laws and
usages of war, and consistent with relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions,
including Resolution 1483." Id. (emphasis omitted).
222. S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 8, at 2.
223. See infra notes 273-81 and accompanying text.
224. Scheffer, supra note 208, at 853.
225. See supra notes 37-45 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
227. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
228. Hague Regulations, supra note 12, 36 Stat, at 2277.
229. Id. art. 43, at 2306.
230. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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word because the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 does not
address the issue, but instead focuses on treatment of the civilian
population. 1 With respect to natural resources, including oil, the
occupier must act solely as an administrator and usufructary, and
"must safeguard the capital of these properties, and administer them
in accordance with the rules of usufruct. 2 32
Scheffer has argued 233 that these restrictions on the occupier, as well
as the essentially humanitarian responsibilities imposed by the Fourth
Geneva Convention, 34 would not, in theory, allow the United States
to pursue its stated goals in Iraq, especially when one considers the
responsibility to respect the "laws in force in the country" unless
"absolutely prevented. 2 35 The radical transformation pursued by the
CPA in Iraq, including the desire to allow the Iraqi people to
determine their own future was "never contemplated '236 by the law of
occupation because it assumed that the defeated sovereign would
return following a temporary occupation. 7 It therefore appears that,
on the theoretical level, there is a large divergence in rationales
between the law of occupation and the stated aims of the occupation
of Iraq.
Furthermore, the cases of the Allied occupations of Germany and
Japan following the Second World War, where the Allies did not
apply the law of occupation and fundamentally changed local
institutions, 23 are of no guidance in Iraq for a number of reasons.
Benvenisti argues that the debellatio doctrine invoked in justification
of the German and Japanese occupations is no longer applicable
following the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, because sovereign
rights are no longer the exclusive domain of states.239 According to
this argument, sovereign rights lie in a people as a whole, not a
political elite, and the fact that the national army has been defeated
cannot "divest" the rest of the population of this sovereignty. 4°
Scheffer concurs in this argument and also points out that it was the
unconditional surrender of Germany that fortified the Allied
argument,241 a situation that has not occurred in Iraq.
231. Geneva Convention, supra note 12, art. 47, 6 U.S.T. at 3548, 75 U.N.T.S. at
318; see also supra note 80 and accompanying text.
232. Hague Regulations, supra note 12, art. 55, 36 Stat. at 2309.
233. Scheffer, supra note 208, at 849.
234. See supra notes 69-78 and accompanying text.
235. Hague Regulations, supra note 12, art. 43, 36 Stat. at 2306.
236. Scheffer, supra note 208, at 849.
237. See Davis P. Goodman, Note, The Need for Fundamental Change in the Law
of Belligerent Occupation, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1573, 1590-91 (1985).
238. See supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text.
239. Benvenisti, supra note 16, at 94-96.
240. Id.
241. Scheffer, supra note 208, at 848; see also Paul Bowers, Iraq: Law of
Occupation, House of Commons Library Research Paper 03/51, at 18 (June 2, 2003),
at http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2003/rp3-051.pdf. The author
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Beyond theoretical analyses of the rationales behind the law of
occupation in general and the occupation of Iraq in particular, two
issue-specific aspects of the occupation of Iraq are of particular
interest. The first is the use of the rich Iraqi oil reserves, 242 and the
second is the stated goal of creating a democratic Iraq with a new
constitution.2 43 The United States has consistently affirmed that Iraq's
oil will be "protected and used for the benefit of the Iraqi people,"
2 4
and the CPA has stated as one of its central objectives that oil will be
"dedicated to the well-being of the Iraqi people. '245  Furthermore,
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483 provides for all
proceeds from oil sales to be deposited into a "Development Fund for
Iraq" until a representative Iraqi government is formed.2 46 The law of
occupation with regard to the use of oil emanates from Article 55 of
the Hague Regulations, which states that the occupier can act solely as
an administrator and usufructary of immovable state property.247
However, one critical question in Iraq, as Langenkamp and Zedalis
have posed it, is whether the production of oil may be increased by
the occupying power under Article 55 of the Hague Regulations.248
The leading case on Article 55 of the Hague Regulations suggests that
a usufructary cannot increase levels of production,2 49 and some
commentators analyzing the Israeli exploitation of oil in Sinai have
agreed with this conclusion. 2 ° Langenkamp and Zedalis, however,
take the opposite view, arguing that as long as the belligerent
occupant does not damage the reservoirs wherein the oil is found and
operates within the "band of reasonable production," Article 55 is not
violated.25'
here looks at the various theories that were presented in favor of the Allies' conduct
in Germany and Japan, and concludes that none apply to the situation in Iraq. Id. at
18-19.
242. Iraq's oil reserves have been estimated at approximately 112 billion barrels.
International Petroleum Encyclopedia 99 (2002).
243. See supra notes 211-13 and accompanying text.
244. Letter to the President of the Security Council, supra note 17.
245. Coalition Provisional Authority, Regulation Number 2, CPA/REG/10 June
2003/02, at 1, available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/REG2.pdf.
246. S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 8, at 6.
247. Hague Regulations, supra note 12, art. 55, 36 Stat. at 2309; see also supra notes
58-66 and accompanying text.
248. See Langenkamp & Zedalis, supra note 109, at 425-29.
249. See Admin. of Waters & Forests v. Falk, 4 Ann. Dig. 563, 563 (Fr. Ct. of Cass.
1927) (holding that the cutting of state-owned trees in excess of the provisions of the
Forest Code by an individual acting under a contract with the occupying military
authority violated the rules of usufruct in Article 55 of the Hague Regulations).
250. Clagett & Johnson, supra note 109, at 574-76 ("[T]he extraction of state-
owned oil from occupied territory by means of new wells constitutes an impermissible
taking of the capital of property protected by Article 55 whether or not the oil taken
is newly discovered.").
251. Langenkamp & Zedalis, supra note 109, at 429; see also Gerson, supra note
109, at 731 (arguing that exploitation is forbidden only when its practice is marked by
"wanton dissipation" of the resources).
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The most pertinent problem created by Article 55, however, is how
oil resources may be used. Here, courts and scholars seem to agree
that revenues must be used solely to provide for the expense of the
occupation. 2  The leading case involving seizure of oil resources
(albeit privately owned) during the Second World War held that the
exploitation of oil may not exceed the demands of the occupant,253
which has been defined as the military needs of the army of
occupation. 4  Stone has noted that the occupant's power over
immovable state property "is measured not by his own needs, but by
the duty to maintain the integrity of the corpus. ' 255  Both the
restriction on the levels of production and on the use of oil revenue
could conflict with U.S. extraction of oil in Iraq, as Langenkamp and
Zedalis note,256 although they argue for an expansive interpretation on
both issues. 57
The stated goals of creating democratic institutions in Iraq25' and
allowing the Iraqi people to determine their own political future259
create a second problematic issue from the perspective of the law of
occupation. In addition to these general pronouncements, it appears
that the CPA has been seriously and concretely pursuing the goal of
establishing a new Constitution for Iraq, complete with a timetable for
its writing and ratification.2" This is consistent with the requirements
of Security Council Resolution 1483, which calls on the CPA to create
conditions in which the Iraqi people can "freely determine their own
political future. ' 26' As noted by Sabel, however, the objective of
changing the regime in Iraq is not sanctioned by the law of
occupation,262 particularly the provisions of Article 43 of the Hague
Regulations, which require compliance with the "laws in force in the
252. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
253. N.V. de Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij v. War Damage Comm'n, 23
I.L.R. 810, 821-22 (Ct. App., Sing. 1956).
254. United States v. Flick, 6 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg
Military Tribunals 1187, 1210 (1947).
255. Stone, supra note 64, at 714.
256. Langenkamp & Zedalis, supra note 109, at 434-35.
257. Id. at 429, 433.
258. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
259. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
260. Constitutional Development, at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/government/Nov-15-
GC-CPA-FinalAgreement-post.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2004). This document on
the CPA website outlines a five-stage process for the future political institutional
framework of Iraq, including the writing of the "Fundamental Law," agreements with
the Coalition on security, the selection of a Transitional National Assembly, the
restoration of Iraq's sovereignty, and a process for the adoption of a permanent
constitution. Id. This seems to be in line with the public pronouncements of
Ambassador Bremer. See, e.g., Bremer, supra note 203.
261. S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 8, at 2.
262. Sabel, supra note 119.
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country" unless the occupier is "absolutely prevented" from doing
SO.
26 3
The most relevant precedent regarding the reform of the
institutional frameworks of occupied countries is the division of
Belgium into two separate administrative zones under German
occupation during the First World War.2' Both the Belgian courts265
and international legal scholars 266 saw this division as a clear violation
of the Hague Regulations. The reform of political institutions in Iraq
may therefore be difficult to justify by the law of occupation,267
although some commentators have argued that the concept of post-
colonial self-determination which has emerged in international law
following the Second World War may supply a justification for such
changes. 268 This argument is based on provisions of Article 64 of the
Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, which appears to afford the
occupying power a limited right to alter national laws 269 and which,
according to Benvenisti, has superseded Article 43 of the Hague
Regulations with regard to the "prescriptive powers" of the
occupation administration.270  Other scholars,27' however, have
rejected this view, relying instead on Article 154 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention, which declares that the Convention is "supplementary
263. Hague Regulations, supra note 12, art. 43, 36 Stat. at 2306.
264. See Pirenne & Vauthier, supra note 85, at 85-105; Solansky, supra note 82, at
170-81.
265. Belgian courts after the war contested any German legislation as prohibited by
the Hague Regulations. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
266. Benvenisti, supra note 16, at 44-46; Feilchenfeld, supra note 41, at 89; 2
Garner, supra note 85, at 79; Pirenne & Vauthier, supra note 85, at 94 ("[L]es
r6formes d6passaient de beaucoup les measures administratives conservatoires
admises par la Convention de La Haye." ("These reforms far exceeded the
conservative administrative measures authorized by the Hague Convention."
(author's translation))).
267. Scheffer, supra note 208, at 844-45.
268. Benvenisti, supra note 209, at 16; Suzanne Nossel, Winning the Postwar, Legal
Aff., May/June 2003, at 18, 21.
269. Geneva Convention, supra note 12, art. 64, 6 U.S.T. at 3558, 75 U.N.T.S. at
328.
270. Benvenisti, supra note 16, at 100, 103-04 n.176. But see Hans-Peter Gasser,
Protection of the Civilian Population, in The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in
Armed Conflicts 209, 246 (Dieter Fleck ed., 1995) ("Not only should the legal status
of the territory remain unaltered by the occupying power, but its political institutions
and public life in general should also be allowed to continue with as little disturbance
as possible.").
271. Gasser, supra note 270, at 255 ("Article 43 [of the Hague Regulations] speaks
unambiguously and without restriction of 'the laws in force in the country.' The
express reference to criminal law in [the Geneva Convention] can be explained by the
fact that during the Second World War, occupying powers interfered in a particularly
scandalous manner with the criminal laws of occupied territories."); Adam Roberts,
Prolonged Military Occupation: The Israeli-Occupied Territories Since 1967, 84 Am.
J. Int'l L. 44, 48 n.7 (1990).
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to" the Hague Regulations,272 which remain in force.
The restrictions that the law of occupation may impose on the
occupying forces in Iraq seem, however, to have been somewhat
altered by Security Council Resolution 1483.273 Indeed, the
Resolution calls explicitly for the application of both the Hague
Regulations and the Geneva Conventions.274 At the same time,
however, it demands that revenues from oil sales be deposited in a
fund for the benefit of the future Iraqi government, and that the Iraqi
people be allowed to determine their own future.275 It is unclear
whether Security Council Resolution 1483 was meant to confer
authority on the CPA beyond that available under the traditional laws
of occupation,2 76 as the authority of a United Nations Security Council
Resolution to interpret a previous treaty has not been precisely
delineated.277
There exists a significant legal debate about the rights of an
occupier to implement either of the specific demands of the
Resolution under the law of occupation,278 and disagreement among
scholars has extended to the interpretation of Resolution 1483.279
Benvenisti sees Resolution 1483 as a much-needed "overhaul" of the
law of occupation in the light of new circumstances,8 ° whereas
Scheffer has argued that the aims of Resolution 1483 cannot be
achieved by the law of occupation alone, however "liberally it may be
construed, '28 1 because of the restrictions that the provisions of that
law imposes on the occupier.
Regardless of the details of these academic debates, however, it
seems relatively clear that the achievement of the aims of the current
occupation of Iraq may be difficult to reconcile with the law of
occupation as presently understood. The alternative model presented
272. Geneva Convention, supra note 12, art 154, 6 U.S.T. at 3620, 75 U.N.T.S. at
390.
273. S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 8.
274. Id. at 2.
275. Id. at 2, 6.
276. See Thomas D. Grant, The Security Council and Iraq: An Incremental
Practice, 97 Am. J. Int'l L. 823, 828 (2003).
277. See generally Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States § 325(2) (1986) ("Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the
interpretation of the agreement, and subsequent practice between the parties in the
application of the agreement, are to be taken into account in its interpretation.");
Michael C. Wood, The Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions, 2 Max Planck
Y.B. of U.N. L. 73, 88-95 (1998) (arguing for a case-by-case contextual interpretation
of Security Council Resolutions and their interactions with other norms of
international law, including treaties).
278. See supra notes 224-72 and accompanying text.
279. Compare Benvenisti, supra note 209, at 21, with Scheffer, supra note 208, at
844-45.
280. Benvenisti, supra note 209, at 21.
281. Scheffer, supra note 208, at 844-45.
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here, that of a system of United Nations governance, poses a different
set of challenges in its implementation.
B. United Nations Governance
While the rationale behind the law of occupation may seem
"unsuited" to the present situation in Iraq,282 the reasoning behind the
deployment of U.N. civil administrations in Kosovo and East Timor
represent an alternative regime, developed in recent years, with
different implications when compared to the law of occupation. While
the stated objectives of the CPA in Iraq can be broadly summarized as
the construction of a new democratic Iraq respectful of the rule of
law,283 the U.N. civil administrations in Kosovo and East Timor were
attempting to achieve similar objectives, in addition to responding to
grave humanitarian concerns. Security Council Resolution 1244,
which established UNMIK, stated the goals of that administration as
"overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing
institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all
inhabitants of Kosovo. '' 28  Similarly, Security Council Resolution
1272 defined UNTAET's mission as providing security and an
effective administration, as well as "[t]o support capacity-building for
self-government. ' 285 The objectives of UNMIK, UNTAET, and the
CPA are broadly comparable. Therefore, assuming a United Nations
procedure could be implemented, the precedents of Kosovo and East
Timor may better allow for the fulfillment of CPA aims in Iraq, as
opposed to the use of the law of occupation.
The legal procedure for the unprecedented United Nations
governance of territory in Kosovo and East Timor was relatively clear.
First, there was the threshold requirement that the Security Council
was acting under its Chapter VII powers,286 following its finding of a
"threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression" under
Article 39 of the Charter.287 Once this threshold was achieved, the
Security Council outlined its objectives for the territory to be
administered in the resolution, 288 and proceeded to facilitate the
282. Id. at 853.
283. See supra notes 211-18, 242-45 and accompanying text.
284. S.C. Res 1244, supra note 29, at 3.
285. S.C. Res 1272, supra note 29, at 3.
286. U.N. Charter ch. VII.
287. Id. art. 39.
288. Resolution 1244, in authorizing the creation of an international civil presence
in Kosovo, states that the objectives of such a presence will be to "provide transitional
administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional
democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal
life for all inhabitants of Kosovo." S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 29, at 3. Similarly,
Resolution 1272 includes as the "elements" of the mandate of UNTAET "to provide
security and maintain law and order throughout the territory of East Timor," as well




attainment of these objectives by vesting all executive, legislative, andjudiciary power for the territory in the Secretary-General's Special
Representative.289
Applying such a scenario to present-day Iraq, the Security Council
would first analyze the situation under Article 39, and then outline its
objectives in a resolution authorizing a civil presence, possibly in a
framework of delegation of power to a number of United Nations
members.290  The main inquiry of this Note, however, does not
concern the objectives of the Security Council, but rather whether the
mechanism of United Nations governance would serve the stated aims
of the CPA in Iraq, particularly those pertaining to a transition to a
self-governing democracy and to the use of local oil resources for the
purpose of funding the reconstruction 291 in a satisfactory manner.
As Professor Matthias Ruffert has recently noted,292 the U.N.
Security Council interpretation has become more expansive regarding
"acts of aggression" or "threats to the peace" under Article 39 of the
Charter,293 extending beyond the traditional inter-state conflict to
include internal threats to the peace. 294  Although this is partly a
political determination,295 it also flows from the broad discretion
which the Security Council enjoys in making determinations regarding
the existence of any "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or an
act of aggression., 296 This discretion has been particularly prominent
in the interpretation of "threats to the peace," which have included
numerous situations, from the invasion of a neighboring state297 to
post-conflict situations such as those which existed in Kosovo or East
Timor.298 In Kosovo and East Timor, the existence of a "threat to the
289. See UNMIK, Regulation on the Authority of the Interim Administration of
Kosovo, UNMIK/REG/1999/1 (1999), available at
http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/1999/regOl-99.htm; UNTAET, Regulation on
the Authority of the Transitional Administration in East Timor,
UNTAET/REG/1999/1 (1999), available at
http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/untaetR/etregl.htm.
290. See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
291. See Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation Number 1, CPA/REG/16 May
2003/01 (stating the goals of the CPA to include restoring security, facilitating
economic recovery and reconstruction, and allowing the Iraqi people to freely
determine their future), available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/REG1.pdf.
292. See Ruffert, supra note 30, at 617 "'Peace' in the sense of Chapter VII is thus
far more than the absence of war between two or more States. It may be related to
the security situation within States."
293. U.N. Charter art. 39.
294. See also 1 Charter Commentary, supra note 135, at 720-21.
295. See White, supra note 145, at 23-27.
296. 1 Charter Commentary, supra note 135, at 719.
297. See White, supra note 145, at 42-47 (describing the Security Council's use of
the "threat to the peace" language of Article 39 in situations including the Arab-
Israeli conflict, Southern Rhodesia, South Africa and Cyprus).
298. The Security Council determined, with respect to Kosovo, that "the situation
in the region continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security," in
Resolution 1244, which created UNMIK. S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 29, at 2. The
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peace" was justified by arguing that the end of a military conflict does
not remove the danger of the recurrence of hostilities.299
This justification would seem particularly transferable to Iraq,
where the official end of hostilities has not coincided with an actual
end to violent activities.3" It is therefore possible that a situation such
as that currently occurring in Iraq could be categorized by the Security
Council as a "threat to the peace,"3 1 triggering other Chapter VII
powers to address the situation. That such a determination is unlikely
at present does not detract from the possibility that, after a military
conflict such as the one in Iraq, the United Nations, acting through the
Security Council, could potentially step in to impose a post-conflict
regime, much as it did following the NATO air strikes against Kosovo
in 1999.302
As noted in Part I.B., the finding by the Security Council of a
"threat to the peace" can lead to a variety of measures by either the
United Nations or some of its members under U.N. auspices.33 This is
particularly true under an expansive interpretation of the United
Nations Charter Article 41, which allows the Security Council to
employ measures "not involving the use of armed force. 3 "4 This
justification was used in both Kosovo and East Timor to impose a
system of United Nations governance.3 5  The powers that the
administration in a regime of United Nations governance receives are
extremely broad, as the regulations on the authority of both UNMIK
and UNTAET make clear, since both place "[a]ll legislative and
executive authority.., including the administration of the judiciary,"
within the power of UNMIK and UNTAET.30 6 This vast grant of
Security Council determined that the "continuing situation in East Timor constitutes
a threat to peace and security" in Resolution 1272, which authorized the creation of
UNTAET. S.C. Res. 1272, supra note 29, at 2.
299. 1 Charter Commentary, supra note 135, at 723.
300. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
301. See Matheson, supra note 23, at 83 ("I believe that any situation-even if
occurring within a singe state-that threatens the peace through such elements as
cross-border violence, substantial refugee flows, serious regional instability, or
appreciable harm to the nationals of another state could lawfully form the basis for a
determination by the Council under Chapter VII.").
302. Id. at 78; Ruffert, supra note 30, at 619.
303. U.N. Charter art. 48.
304. Id. art. 41.
305. 1 Charter Commentary, supra note 135, at 743-45.
306. The relevant sections read as follows: "All legislative and executive authority
with respect to Kosovo, including the administration of the judiciary, is vested in
UNMIK and is exercised by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General."
UNMIK, Regulation on the Authority of the Interim Administration of Kosovo,
UNMIK/REG/1999/1 (1999), available at
http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/1999/reg0l-99.htm. "All legislative and
executive authority with respect to East Timor, including the administration of the
judiciary, is vested in UNTAET and is exercised by the Transitional Administrator.
In exercising these functions the Transitional Administrator shall consult and
cooperate closely with representatives of the East Timorese people." UNTAET,
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power was merely a means to achieve the overall objectives of the
missions of UNMIK and UNTAET, °7 which were the stabilization of
the area and the implementation of a system of democratic
governance (and self-determination), as expressed in Security Council
Resolutions 1244 and 1272.308 In addition to these vast grants of
power, however, some important safeguards exist with respect to the
operation of the U.N. All U.N. forces conducting operations under
U.N. command and control are bound by international humanitarian
law.30 9 Furthermore, the first regulation issued by both UNMIK and
UNTAET proclaimed their observance of a series of international
human rights conventions in the administration of Kosovo and East
Timor.31° While a strong current of academic literature has criticized
Regulation on the Authority of the Transitional Administration in East Timor,
UNTAET/REG/1999/1 (1999), available at
http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/untaetR/etregl.htm.
307. See Beauvais, supra note 189, at 1111 (pointing out that the "strategic
objective" of UNTAET was independent statehood for East Timor).
308. S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 29, at 3; S.C. Res. 1272, supra note 29, at 2-3; see
also supra note 288.
309. See Carla Bongiorno, A Culture of Impunity: Applying International Human
Rights Law to the United Nations in East Timor, 33 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 623,
641-43 (2002); Ruffert, supra note 30, at 622; Scheffer, supra note 208, at 851.
310. The UNMIK regulation text on this point reads:
In exercising their functions, all persons undertaking public duties or holding
public office in Kosovo shall observe internationally recognized human
rights standards and shall not discriminate against any person on any ground
such as sex, race, color, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national, ethnic or social origin, association with a national community,
property, birth or other status.
UNMIK, Regulation on the Authority of the Interim Administration of Kosovo,
UNMIK/REG/1999/1, available at http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/
1999/reg0l-99.htm. The UNTAET regulation reads:
In exercising their functions, all persons undertaking public duties or holding
public office in East Timor shall observe internationally recognized human
rights standards, as reflected, in particular, in:
The Universal Declaration on Human Rights of 10 December 1948;
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 16
December 1966 and its Protocols;
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of
16 December 1966;
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination of 21 December 1965;
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women of 17 December 1979;
The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 17 December 1984;
The International Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20
November 1989.
UNTAET, Regulation on the Authority of the Transitional Administration in East
Timor, UNTAET/REG/1999/1, available at http://www.un.org/peace/
etimor/untaetR/etregl.htm. Criticism of the application of these provisions has
emerged recently. Bongiorno, supra note 309 (arguing that the lack of formal
structures for monitoring and accountability with regard to human rights obligations
illustrates that UNTAET was not conceived as an entity with human rights
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the records of UNMIK and UNTAET recently,"' these commentators
have focused on the way in which those administrations actually
worked,31 2 not on the legal right of the United Nations Administration
to participate in the creation of these institutions. Given the broad
powers provided both to UNMIK and to UNTAET by the Security
Council acting under Chapter VII powers which are binding on all
member states, the legislative and institution-building power of the
U.N. administrations has not been seriously doubted." 3
Under the broad powers of previous U.N. civil administrations, the
stated aims of the CPA in Iraq314 could well be achieved, as Scheffer
has recently argued.3"5 Certainly, the transition to a self-governing
democracy and the crafting of a new constitution for Iraq, two of the
clearly stated aims of the CPA,316 would be within the powers of the
Special Representative of the Secretary-General under a system of
U.N. governance like that set up in Kosovo and East Timor. The
experience of UNMIK and UNTAET attest to the vast legislative and
institutional power held by the U.N. administration, for example in
the reconstruction of judiciary systems in both Kosovo and East
Timor after their complete collapse.317 Additionally, in both Kosovo
and East Timor, the implementing Security Council Resolutions
vested institution-building power in the hands of UNMIK and
UNTAET.3"8  Such precedents would seem to allow a similar
institution-building capacity in a situation such as the current
obligations); David Marshall & Shelley Inglis, The Disempowerment of Human
Rights-Based Justice in the United Nations Mission in Kosovo, 16 Harv. Hum. Rts. J.
95 (2003) (arguing that UNMIK has disregarded international human rights thus
setting a bad precedent in the region).
311. See, e.g., Jarat Chopra, Building State Failure in East Timor, 33 Dev. &
Change 979 (2002) (arguing that UNTAET failed in East Timor because it did not
decentralize its power while excluding the local population from the equation); Paulo
GorjAo, The Legacy and Lessons of the United Nations Transitional Administration in
East Timor, Contemp. Southeast Asia, Aug. 2002, at 313 (arguing that UNTAET was
neither a complete success nor a complete failure and that the main problem affecting
UNTAET in East Timor was a lack of efficiency coupled with problems of
accountability).
312. See, e.g., Wendy S. Betts et al., The Post-Conflict Transitional Administration
of Kosovo and the Lessons-Learned in Efforts to Establish a Judiciary and Rule of
Law, 22 Mich. J. Int'l L. 371 (2001).
313. Matheson, supra note 23, at 85; Ruffert, supra note 30, at 622; 1 Charter
Commentary, supra note 135, at 744.
314. See supra note 291 and accompanying text.
315. Scheffer, supra note 208, at 853.
316. See supra notes 211-13 and accompanying text.
317. Strohmeyer, supra note 201, at 46-59.
318. Security Council Resolution 1244 on Kosovo authorizes the international civil
presence to "provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the
development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions." S.C. Res 1244,
supra note 29, at 3. Resolution 1272, on East Timor, lists one of UNTAET's roles as
"[t]o support capacity-building for self-government," as well as envisioning the
"development of local democratic institutions." S.C. Res. 1272, supra note 29, at 3.
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occupation of Iraq, as Scheffer has argued.319 Similarly, with respect
to another major objective of the CPA in Iraq, the use of oil resources
for the "well-being of the Iraqi people, 3 2° the vesting of all executive
and legislative powers in the United Nations authority would certainly
seem to allow for such measures.
This Note therefore argues that a system of U.N. governance, such
as those created in Kosovo and East Timor, appears to be well-suited
to perform precisely the tasks of building democratic institutions and
achieving economic reconstruction that the CPA has stated as its
objectives in Iraq. Such a model would also be a more propitious
framework for the achievement of such objectives than the more
restrictive exigencies of the law of occupation.
III. TOWARDS A NEW APPROACH TO THE LAW OF POST-CONFLICT
SOCIETIES
In contrast to the system of U.N. governance outlined in Part II.B.,
the law of belligerent occupation is clearly unsuited for the present
situation in Iraq. Originally codified during the American Civil War,
its notions of occupation following conventional warfare between two
state sovereigns no longer satisfy the purpose of modern
occupations.32' Since the Second World War, the law of occupation
has been essentially dormant, mostly because occupying powers
realized what significant restrictions the label of "occupier" would
imply under the Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva
Convention.3 2  When the occupier completely transformed the
institutional, economic, and political makeup of the occupied country,
such as in Germany and Japan after the Second World War, the law of
occupation was abandoned by resorting to customary international
law.
323
In addition to the general historical differences between the early
twentieth century and the present occupation of Iraq, the law of
occupation suffers from its own misuse. Indeed, while some
commentators have argued for the introduction of concepts of self-
determination into the law of occupation, this has never been
achieved in practice during the past fifty years.324 While the law of
occupation was created to ensure against massive transformations by
the occupier, the current situation in Iraq is a perfect example of the
irrelevance, more than the potential use, of the law of occupation.
The arguments between Benvenisti and Scheffer regarding the
319. Scheffer, supra note 208, at 853.
320. Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation Number 2, CPA/REG/10 June
2003/02, at 1, available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/REG2.pdf.
321. See supra notes 25, 34-45 and accompanying text.
322. See supra notes 119-30 and accompanying text.
323. See supra notes 112-18 and accompanying text.
324. See supra notes 268-72 and accompanying text.
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interpretation of Security Council Resolution 1483,325 and its influence
on the law of occupation, indicate that a new direction has been
created for the law of occupation in Iraq. While Benvenisti holds that
the Resolution was an "overhaul" of the law of occupation,326 it seems
that the resolution itself merely resuscitated the law of occupation
without acknowledging its full implications. The resolution calls
simultaneously for the respect of the Hague Regulations of 1907 and
the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and also for the members of the
United Nations "to assist the people of Iraq in their efforts to reform
their institutions and rebuild their country." '327 While certainly a
desirable objective, it does not seem to be achievable through the
restrictions imposed on the occupier by the laws of occupation. It
would seem particularly hard to reform institutions, rebuild the
country, and create a democracy if one is bound to respect the "laws
in force in the country," as required by Article 43 of the Hague
Regulations.328
Although some scholars have argued that notions of self-
determination and Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention have
altered the restrictions of Article 43 of the Hague Regulations,329 the
text of the Fourth Geneva Convention does not seem to support this
view. Indeed, as Article 154 of the Fourth Geneva Convention states,
the Convention is "supplementary to" the Hague Regulations,33 ° and
the Convention's Article 64 does not address general legislation3 3 1 in
the same way that Article 43 of the Hague Regulations does.332
Rather, it addresses certain justifications for a change in the penal law
under an occupation.333  The Hague Regulations remain the
fundamental text with regard to the powers and obligations of the
occupying power, while the Fourth Geneva Convention is more
concerned with the protection of the civilian population and other
humanitarian provisions. Therefore, Article 43 of the Hague
Regulations essentially prohibits the institutional reform pursued by
the CPA in Iraq.
With respect to the use of oil resources in Iraq, while Resolution
1483 calls for the creation of a Development Fund wherein oil
revenues should be deposited for a number of different purposes,
325. See supra notes 278-81 and accompanying text.
326. See supra note 280 and accompanying text.
327. S.C. Res 1483, supra note 8, at 2.
328. Hague Regulations, supra note 12, art. 43, 36 Stat. at 2306.
329. See supra note 270 and accompanying text.
330. Geneva Convention, supra note 12, art. 154, 6 U.S.T. at 3620, 75 U.N.T.S. at
390.
331. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
332. See supra notes 48-56 and accompanying text.
333. Geneva Convention, supra note 12, art. 64, 6 U.S.T. at 3558, 75 U.N.T.S. at
328; see also supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
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including the economic reconstruction of Iraq,334 the law of occupation
imposes restrictions on the levels of production and the use of oil
revenues that may well prove incompatible with the requirements of
the Resolution.335
Since Resolution 1483 seems to define the objectives of both the
United Nations and the CPA in Iraq (the CPA has essentially adopted
much of the language of the Resolution in its Regulations), 3 6 it is even
more surprising to have recourse to a body of law which has nothing
to do with these objectives, and that in fact was specifically established
to impede anything but a temporary transfer of de facto authority
pending a return of the defeated sovereign. 337 Benvenisti's arguments
about the "overhaul" of the law of occupation would sound more
persuasive had this law not been dormant across the world in the
second half of the twentieth century.338 Rather, given the large and
evident discrepancy in rationales between the law of occupation as
codified and the situation in Iraq339 where important structural
changes have been deemed necessary by both the United Nations and
the CPA,34° a more analogous and recent legal mechanism could be
used.
As noted in Part II.B. above, the model of U.N. governance was
developed to deal with situations strikingly similar to the one in Iraq:
territories in need, for different reasons, of a complete overhaul, both
economically and politically. 341 That was certainly the case for Kosovo
and East Timor, and UNMIK and UNTAET were empowered to
perform these tasks by the vesting in them of vast powers: legislative,
executive, and judicial.342
A potential political obstacle is introduced because of the threshold
requirement that the United Nations Security Council find the
existence of a "threat to the peace" under Article 39 in order to
authorize the deployment of civil administration under Article 41 (or
to delegate this responsibility under Article 48 to certain U.N.
member states).343  Assuming that such a political obstacle is
overcome, however, the model of United Nations governance
established from the experiences of UNMIK and UNTAET seems a
far more satisfactory way to achieve the stated aims3" of both the
CPA and the United Nations (as stated in Security Council
334. See supra notes 242-46 and accompanying text.
335. See supra notes 247-57 and accompanying text.
336. See supra notes 220-21 and accompanying text.
337. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
338. See supra notes 119-30 and accompanying text.
339. See supra notes 224-41 and accompanying text.
340. See supra notes 211-23 and accompanying text.
341. See supra notes 282-85 and accompanying text.
342. See supra notes 180-200 and accompanying text.
343. See supra notes 286-91 and accompanying text.
344. See supra notes 211-13 and accompanying text.
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Resolution 1483) in Iraq. The vesting of specific institution-building
powers, in addition to all legislative, executive and judicial power,
would allow a United Nations administration to proceed along the
road to Iraqi self-government under a democratic constitution of their
choosing, without any restrictions concerning the "laws [currently] in
force" in the country.345 Similarly, with regard to oil resources, a U.N.
governance model would replace the restrictions of the Hague
Regulations346 with the simple mandates of a Security Council
resolution. Furthermore, the one aim of the law of occupation that
still holds some importance in the context of modern combat and
occupations, the protection of civilian populations, would theoretically
be covered by the human rights conventions and humanitarian law
that binds United Nations personnel.347
Outside these academic reflections, however, Security Council
Resolution 1483 has created what can only be described as a hybrid
between the objectives of a system of governance as it existed in
Kosovo and East Timor (in the exhortation to "assist the people of
Iraq in their efforts to reform their institutions and rebuild their
country"), 348 and the restrictions of the law of occupation. These
objectives cannot be pursued within the framework of the law of
occupation and therefore the law of occupation continues to be
honored by its breach349 as the CPA pushes forward with its plans to
transform Iraq. Security Council Resolution 1483, therefore, has not
contributed to the resuscitation of the law of occupation, but instead
should be seen as a starting point in a debate regarding the modern
direction of legal frameworks for post-conflict societies where the law
of occupation was once the only option.
What can the experience of Iraq, from the hoisting of the American
flag in al-Fardos square to the invocation of the law of occupation,
teach us for the future of the law of occupation, or for future
occupations? First, the law of occupation was created for specific
reasons that may well reoccur but that no longer characterize the
common form of conflict and post-conflict realities .3  Nonetheless,
the law of occupation is not relegated to irrelevance. It is still possible
to imagine conflicts occurring within the traditional form envisioned
by the framers of the Hague Regulations, that is, a conflict between
two fully sovereign states where one state occupies the other
immediately following the conflict. In such a situation, the law of
occupation should apply, as it could ensure the sovereignty of the
345. Hague Regulations, supra note 12, art. 43, 36 Stat. at 2306; see also supra notes
260-72 and accompanying text.
346. See supra notes 57-66 and accompanying text.
347. See supra notes 309-10 and accompanying text.
348. S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 8, at 2.
349. See supra note 209.
350. See supra notes 121-32 and accompanying text.
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defeated state and the protection of the 'defeated' population.351
Today, however, conflicts are rarely contests between sovereign
governments and their military forces with civilians relegated to
passive roles which necessitate protection. Therefore the law of
occupation as currently understood should not apply to these
conflicts.
Second, the law of occupation has not adapted to new situations,
largely because it was ignored by occupants in the modern era of
warfare. 2  Benvenisti may argue that the Fourth Geneva
Convention's recognition of the sovereignty of the people defeated
the existence of any debellatio exception to the law of occupation, and
that Security Council Resolution 1483 is a vindication of this
position,353 but a vacuum of more than fifty years separates the two
events, a period during which the law of occupation was largely
forgotten. It is not an exception to the law of occupation that was
vindicated by Security Council Resolution 1483, but rather the law of
occupation as a whole was shown to be inadequate for the task at
hand. The historians can celebrate as the practitioners mourn.
Third, while the experience of occupations may have outgrown the
formalities of the law of occupation, with new realities come new legal
frameworks. The existence of a United Nations governance model to
replace the law of occupation is precisely such a framework. This
model may not fit into the myriad categories of occupations that may
occur during armed conflicts, and it depends not on the recognition by
the occupier of its application, but on a determination that the model
applies by the United Nations Security Council.3 54  Once this
determination is made, however, the U.N. governance can be fine-
tuned according to the stated goals of the mission, all the while
respecting humanitarian law and major human rights conventions.355
While the introduction of decision making at the political level of the
United Nations Security Council may seem to some to be a high price
to pay to create such a framework for U.N. governance, such decision
making provides greater legitimacy and allows for the creation of
better legal tools to achieve such a mission.
351. See supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
352. See supra notes 121-30 and accompanying text.
353. See supra notes 239-40 and accompanying text.
354. See supra notes 300-06 and accompanying text.
355. See supra notes 309-10 and accompanying text.
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